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Cook, Peter, Interview, Founder & Director at Security Association for the Maritime Industry 
(SAMI), London, United Kingdom, 15 September 2015. 
 
Questionnaire about the use of private security personnel on board of commercial vessels 
 
Dear Mr. Cook, 
Thank you for helping with my Master thesis. I would like to ask you a couple of questions 
regarding piracy and the use of armed guards as a counter-mechanism. 
 
 
1. Getting reliable data about pirate attacks seems to be difficult, but generally it is said 
that the problem of piracy recently moved from Africa over to Asian waters. Is that 
true?  I agree it isn’t that easy to get accurate data about the number of teams being 
used by vessels around the globe.  This is partly because the PMSCs don’t really 
advertise it and shipping companies are reluctant to tell people they are using PCASP 
as well.  I have attached a couple of slides that will show the level of global piracy and 
how many teams are being used at present. 
 
2. It is estimated that in 2012 around 40 % of the commercial ships passing through HRA 
used PMSC personnel. How many vessels do really use private security guards 
nowadays?  When I attended the launch of the OBP 2014 report in June the 
international shipping associations and EUNAVFOR agreed that it is still around 35-




3. In the media, one often finds the worry about potential misconduct of PMSC operators 
during their employment and comparisons are made with Blackwater contractors in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. Does this risk really exist? Whilst of course there will have been 
some incidents historically of excessive force being used by PCASP, I think that is 
mostly in the early days of the use of PCASP.  At the Contact Group for Piracy off the 
Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) meeting at the UN in New York last July the report from 
UNODC told us that the pirates they interviewed were most scared of the navies rather 
than armed guards.  This indicates to me that the guards no longer overstep the mark 
as it were and work within the 100 Series RUF.  I have also added a slide that shows 
the introduction of the regulatory structure for PMSCs and PCASP. 
 
4. The IMO seems to disapprove the use of armed guards. Has this view changed with 
the increasing employment?  The IMO were initially reticent to endorse the used of 
armed guards because that it what their flag State membership felt.  The IMO is a 
secretariat that provides the collective mouthpiece for its members rather than forming 
its own independent opinion.  I do have regular conversations with members of the 
IMO secretariat and many of them can completely see the utility of the armed guards 
as long as they are correctly managed. 
 
5. In my thesis. I analyse the legal foundations of the use of PMSC personnel in 
international law, but as you know, there are no existing legal standards, only soft law. 
Do we need concrete laws for the use of PMSC on a national or even international 
level? Are soft law standards, like BMP, sufficient?   The main law that is used on the 
High Seas, in international waters is English or Common Law and this is built 
precedent, which requires cases to be taken to court.  This has not happened yet and so 
the body of law has not been built.  We do have the contract BIMCO’s GUARDCON, 
which is existing contract law.  We have the standard ISO 28007, which is a standard 
that PMSCs may be measured against in the conduct of operations should their case be 
taken to court. We also have the 100 Series Rules for the Use of Force 
(www.100seriesrules.com) that is being used regularly.  The problem is that no one 
has brought a case to court.  There was a case in the Seychelles last Jan/Feb but this 
did not focus on the armed guards as their actions were successful in deterring the 
pirates. 
 
6.  Are floating armouries commonly used?  Floating Armouries are commonly used and 
there are around 17-20 at sea today in three key points; Southern Red Sea, Off the port 
of Fujairah and Sri Lanka.  The Floating Armouries are being used because the 
adjacent nations will not allow weapons, ammunition and security related equipment 
to be unloaded and stored in their ports.  SAMI is in the process of conducting a 
comprehensive survey of Floating Armouries for the Marshall Islands, which will be 
presented to the IMO next year. 
 
7. My thesis is obviously very abstract and getting profound details about the daily work 
of PMSC operators is fairly difficult. But in reality, do these operators face many 
obstacles in terms of customs and controls of local governments or is it more of a 
hidden industry? There are many complex rules and requirements that PMSC and 
PCASP have to work with in order to get the job done.  How easy is it to traverse 
through multiple territorial waters and to anchor in ports with weapons on board? Each 
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country has its own rules regarding the carriage of weapons, ammunition and security 
related equipment that apply in its TTW but Coastal States don’t always let the 
industry know what those rules are (a selection of the information provided to the 





Slides added by Peter Cook: 
Slide 1: 
 
Comment by Peter Cook: An excellent example of how this “blending  public and private 
maritime security activities……. into an integrated effort that addresses all maritime threats.” 
can be seen in this slide. The coloured bars at the bottom show the trend of PCASP 
employment by vessels crossing the HRA between Jan 12 and Jul 15, we think the overall 
increase is partly due to more ships transiting the HRA because of the general economic 
improvement.  The dips in spring and autumn correlate with the monsoon periods.  It was 
agreed by BIMCO and EUNAVFOR in June that the percentage of vessels carrying PCASP is 
still around 35-40% although team sizes have dropped from 4 to 3 and in some cases only two 
team members.  There is also a difference in the nationalities of team members from Anglo 




You can also see the gradual introduction of the regulatory structure for the provision of 
private maritime security on ships from the publishing of BIMCO’s GUARDCON in Jan 12, 
right through to the introduction of ISO 28007 and we now have 55 PMSCs (44 of which are 
SAMI members) that have been certified. 
The red star May 12 denotes the last successful hijacking of a large commercial ship 
SMYRNI, which was released in May 13.    
One other thing I think this slide demonstrates is that there is under reporting, otherwise why 





Comment by Peter Cook: Piracy and maritime security are global, whilst the number of 
reported incidents in the HRA have decreased the piracy networks have not been destroyed or 
dismantled and could easily be reinvigorated were circumstances to change and the risk v 
return equation swing back in favour of the pirates. Piracy and armed robbery at sea in the 
Gulf of Guinea continues and in the OBP report for 2014 around half of the reported incidents 
have taken place outside TTW.  However the piracy business model is very different and so 
the counter piracy model also has to be different.  It is likely that the problems in the GoG 
will continue for some considerable time. The number of incidents in the SE Asia region are 
also increasing and whilst the level of violence is much less than other areas but crews on 
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ships are becoming progressively worried and an increasing number of enquiries are being 
made to our members about security options in the region. 
 
Koch, Christopher, Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime 
Transportation  regarding “International Piracy on the High Seas”, 04 February 2009.  
 
Sekimizu, Koji, Maritime Safety Committee, 90th session, Opening address, 16 May 2012, 
available at: http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/SecretaryGeneral/Secretary-


























Blackwater versus Blackbeard: Which international regulations exist for the use of private 
maritime security companies in vessel protection operations? 
 
I. Introduction 
Although piracy was a neglected issue in the twentieth century, especially in the last two 
decades it gained attention as a serious threat to global shipping.1 A key date for modern 
piracy was 2008 in particular. In this year alone, 293 total attacks against ships occurred:  49 
vessels were hijacked, 889 crew members were taken as hostages, 11 were shot and 21 went 
missing.2 Compared to 2007, the number of attacked ships rose by 11 %. Similar numbers 
exist for the year 2009.3 All of a sudden piracy gained the attention of the international 
community and the media. 
Modern piracy consists mainly of capturing a ship and selling its cargo, as well as 
hostage taking. It is estimated that in the Horn of Africa only, pirates made between $339 
million and $413 million in ransom profits in the last few years4, a sum between $ 30 million 
and $ 150 million of ransoms paid is estimated for 2008.5  Famous piracy attacks include the 
hijacking of the Maersk Alabama in 2009, which is known as the first successful pirate 
seizure of a ship registered under the American flag since the early nineteenth century.6 Other 
known cases are the kidnapping of the German container ship Hansa Stavanger in 2009 and of 
the French luxury yacht Le Ponant in 2008.  
The cost of piracy for the shipping industry increased enormously with the rise of these 
attacks. 
                                                 
1 O’Meara, Richard M., ‘Maritime piracy in the 21st century‘, Journal of Global Change and Governance, 2007, 
p. 2 (hereafter: O’Meara); Geiβ, Robin & Petring, Anna, Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea, 2011, p. 1, 7 
(hereafter: Geiβ & Petrig). 
2 ICC Commercial Crime Services, IMB reports unprecedented number of hijackings, 16 January 2009, available 
at: https://icc-ccs.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=332:imb-reports-unprecedented-rise-in-
maritime-highjackings&catid=60:news&itemid051 (last seen: 16 June 2015). 
3 Geiβ & Petrig, p. 7. 
4 UN News Center Report, 01 November 2013, available at:  
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=46402&Cr=somalia&Cr1 (last seen: 16 June 2015). 
5 Isenberg, David, ‘The Rise of Private Maritime Security Companies’, Somalia Report, 26 May 2012, 
(hereafter: Isenberg). 




Even though the cost of piracy for the world’s economy is fairly difficult to estimate 
due to a lack of consensus on how to quantify the financial implications and a shortage of 
data, the approximated costs are alarming. Reports of the non-profit organisation Oceans 
Beyond Piracy, estimate a total economic cost of US$7–US$12 billion for 2010 and even in 
2014 a number of roughly US $ 3, 2 billion is estimated, excluding the costs of attacks in 
South East Asia.7 The costs include ransoms, insurance premiums, the deployment of national 
navies, the prosecution of pirates, the re-routing of ships and the costs of deterrence and 
security equipment. 
As a result of these incidents, shipping companies, governments, insurances and 
maritime organisations have approached the problem in different ways. Navies have been 
dispatched to waters where incidents occur most frequently, multinational operations have 
been set up, piracy reporting centres have been established and crews have been trained for 
worst case scenarios, such as hijackings on the open water. 
Unsurprisingly, the increase in criminal activities on the high seas also whetted the 
appetite of private maritime security companies (PMSCs).8 A PMSC, in the context of this 
study, is a company which provides protection for ships or oil rigs against pirates or other 
threats, especially with the employment of armed teams under a private contract stipulated 
with the ship owner.9 The guards who protect the ships are often called Privately Contracted 
Armed Security Personnel (PCASP) or simply contractors. 
In this respect, they differ from private military companies (PMC), which often serve armies 
under a public contract stipulated by government authorities, even though contracts are 
sometimes signed with private corporations or international organisations.10  
Companies such as Background Asia Risk Solutions, HollowPoint Protective Services, 
Drum Cussac or Hart Security provide professional shipping protection.11 Furthermore, 
                                                 
7 Reports of Oceans Beyond Piracy, available at: http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/obp-
reports?field_region_tid=All&field_obp_type_of_document_tid=113&field_obp_author_tid=All&field_subject_
tid=All (last seen: 10 July 2015). 
8 In many publications, one finds terms such as private military companies (PMC) or private security companies 
(PSC). In this thesis, the PMSC is used exclusively. 
9 Francioni, Francesco & Ronzitti, Natalino, War by contract, 2011, p. 44 (hereafter: Franciconi & Ronzitti). 
10 Francioni & Ronzitti, p. 1. 
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probably the most notorious private security company, Academi (formerly Blackwater 
Worldwide12), has also entered the maritime security sector to provide security against piracy 
at sea on board vessels.13  Another widespread service is the use of escort vessels, which 
convoy ships through certain areas.14 Academi bought a 183-foot vessel, the McArthur, 
equipped for counter-piracy missions to provide escort services.15 Even U.S. military officials, 
for example, General David Petraeus, former chief of the U.S. Central Command, have 
recommended the employment of private firms for counter-piracy protection.16 
 
The use of Private Military Companies rose significantly during the Iraq and 
Afghanistan wars.17 Generally, their main tasks consist of engaging in combat and protection 
services, providing advice and training and providing logistics and transportation.18  
This involvement has resulted in concerns over the management, accountability and 
transparency of the PMC industry, resulting from reports about excessive force, cultural 
                                                                                                                                                        
11 Francioni & Ronzitti, p. 38; Mineau, Michael, Pirates, ‘Blackwater and maritime security: The rise of private 
navies in response to modern piracy’, Journal of International Business and Law, 2010,  p. 67f. (hereafter: 
Mineau).  
12 Associated press, ‘Another name change for former Blackwater firm as CEO explains how new title is inspired 
by Greek warriors’, 13 December 2011, available at: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2073440/Another-
change-Blackwater-firm-CEO-explains-new-title-inspired-Greek-warriors.html (last seen: 16 July 2015). 
13 Mineau, p. 66; Spearin, Christopher, PMSCs v. International Naval Endeavors v. Somali Pirates., Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, 2012, p. 828 (hereafter: Spearin).  
14 Spearin, p. 827. 
15 Mineau, p. 66. 
16 Keyes, Charly, ‘Petraeus tells shipping companies to 'get more serious' about piracy’, CNN, 24 September 
2009, available at: http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/04/24/petraeus.pirates/index.html?iref=24hours 
(last seen: 16 July 2006); also see: Mineau, p. 64. 
17 Singer, Peter W., ‘Outsourcing War’, Foreign affairs, March/April 2005, p. 1f. (hereafter: Singer 2005); 
Singer, Peter W. ‘The Private Military Industry and Iraq: What have we learned and where to next?’ Geneva 
Centre for The Democratic Control Of Armed Forces Policy Paper, November 2004, p. 1f. (hereafter: Singer 
2004). 




insensibility and lack of oversight.19 Claims arose that the PMC industry would be ‘less 
regulated than the cheese industry’.20  
 
In 2014, four former on-land contractors of Blackwater were convicted and sentenced 
to long prison terms for killing 14 unarmed civilians during a fire fight in Baghdad in 2007.21 
Similar concerns that animated the debate over PMC forces in Iraq and Afghanistan may 
apply to the high seas. Incidents in which pirates got shot by PMSC personnel had already 
occurred, for instance one on the Avocet, a vessel traversing the Indian Ocean in 2011, 22 and 
another on the Almezaan23 in the Gulf of Aden. Furthermore, a report about the killing of a 
Somali fisherman was published in 2014, shot by an armed contractor who mistook him for a 
pirate.24 
Hence, legal questions about the seizing of pirates, the use of force, criminal 
jurisdiction and the carrying of weapons arise. The actual practical relevance of this question 
is demonstrated by the arrest of six security guards in India, employed on the U.S.-owned ship 
MV Seaman Guard Ohio.25 The former British servicemen were providing anti-piracy 
protection in the Indian Ocean when the ship was intercepted and undeclared weapons and 
ammunition were found. 
                                                 
19 Coito, Christopher Joel, ‘Pirates vs. Private Security: Commercial Shippping, the Montreaux Document, and 
the Battle for the Gulf of Aden’, California Law Review, 2013, p. 183f. (hereafter: Coito); Franciconi & Ronzitti, 
p. 1. 
20 Singer 2004, p 14. 
21 The United States Department of Justice, Justice News, ‘Four Former Blackwater Employees Found Guilty of 
Charges in Fatal Nisur Square Shooting in Iraq  22 October 2014’, available at: 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/four-former-blackwater-employees-found-guilty-charges-fatal-nisur-square-
shooting-iraq (last seen: 16 June 2015). 
22 Mahard, Sean Patrick, ‘Blackwater’s new Battlefield’, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 2014, p. 
333f. (hereafter: Mahard); Wiese Bockmann, Michelle & Katz, Allan, ʽShooting to Kill Pirates Risks Blackwater 
Moment‘, Bloomberg, 09 May 2012, avilable at: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-05-08/shooting-
to-kill-pirates-risks-blackwater-moment (last seen: 08 July 2015) (hereafter: Wiese & Katz). 
23 Coito, p. 176; Franciconi & Ronzitti, p. 44. 
24 The Economist, ‘Laws and Guns’, 14 April 2014, available at: http://www.economist.com/node/21552553 (last 
seen: 08 July 2015). 
25 BBC News, ‘India drops arms charges against British crew’, 11 July 2014, available at: 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-28270337 (last seen: 08 July 2015). 
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This study aims to find the international legal foundations and requirements for the use 
of PMSCs on the high seas. To begin the analysis, a legal definition of piracy will be given 
and its causes and consequences will be outlined. Afterwards, the counter methods against 
piracy will be highlighted and a categorisation of the PMSC industry with its costs and 
benefits will be given. This is followed by a legal analysis of the present legal foundations and 
requirements for the use of PCASPs in international law. The first question is whether 
humanitarian law could be applied to actions of modern piracy, after which we will examine 
the question of the applicability of the Montreux Document26 for PMSCs. Thereafter, the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas27 rules concerning the use of maritime 
guards will be analysed in order to determine whether the use of force and self-defence 
against pirates can be justified. Moreover, key mechanisms and regulations for the use of 
PMSCs will be proposed and an overview and analysis of existing international soft law 
standards will be provided and discussed followed by a short overview of regional regulations 
concerning PMSCs. The study will conclude with a summary of the investigation.  
 
II. The use of PMSCs against piracy 
1. The act of piracy  
a) What is piracy?  
For the purpose of this paper, one has to define the term piracy in the context of 
international law. Art. 101 of the UNCLOS provides a narrow legal definition of piracy. It is 
described as: 
 
(a) any illegal acts of violence   or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for 
private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and 
directed: 
                                                 
26 The Montreux Document on pertinent international legal obligations and good practices of States related to 
operations of private military and security companies during armed conflict, 17 September 2008 
(hereafter: Montreux Document). 
27 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas signed on 10 December 1982 (hereafter: UNCLOS). 
27 Bennett, Thomas  W. & Strug, Jonathan, Introduction to International Public Law, 2013, p. 379 (hereafter: 
Bennett & Strug); Mahard, p. 338. 
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(i) on the  high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property 
on board such ship or aircraft;     
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of 
any state; 
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with 
knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; 
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) 
or (b). 
 
This definition enjoys universal acceptance, even in States which have not adopted 
UNCLOS and can therefore be regarded as international customary law.28 The ‘high seas’ 
include any area which is outside territorial waters and not within the jurisdiction of any 
State.29 More precisely, they exclude the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or the 
internal waters of a State, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State, art. 86 
UNCLOS.  
According to art. 103 UNCLOS, a ship or aircraft is considered a pirate ship or aircraft if 
it is intended by the persons in dominant control to be used for the purpose of committing one 
of the acts referred to in art. 101 UNCLOS. The same applies if the ship or aircraft has been 
used to commit any such act, so long as it remains under the control of the persons guilty of 
that act.  
If the piracy acts described in art. 101 UNCLOS occur in territorial waters, they can be 
categorised as banditry or armed robbery.30 The same counts for persons who mutiny or 
commit acts of banditry without the involvement of a second ship, due to a lack of the so 
called “Two-Ship-Requirement” in art. 101 (a) UNCLOS.31 In art. 3 of the Rome Convention 
of 1988, one can find a broader definition of piracy.32 The Rome Convention established a 
legal basis for prosecuting maritime violence that did not fall within the UNCLOS piracy 
                                                 
 
 
29 Art. 105 UNCLOS. 
30 Franciconi & Ronzitti, p. 39. 
31 Geiβ & Petrig, p. 62; Franciconi & Ronzitti, p. 39. 
32 Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of maritime navigation of 1988 (hereafter: 
Rome Convention; also known as SUA Act). 
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framework. Nevertheless, the key definition of the term remains as an “act of violence, 
depredation committed for private ends”.33  
If acts of a ship or its crew against another ship are motivated by political ends, they can 
be qualified as acts of insurgency or even terrorism.34 But it has to be mentioned that the 
categorisation of these incidents is blurred and highly theoretical and, a strict distinction can 
often be difficult.35 Defeated insurgents can turn to pirates and vice-versa. Furthermore, 
political motivation can be used as a fig leaf for committing criminal acts. For example, one 
of the justifications raised by the Somali pirate community is that illegal fishing or dumping 
dangerous waste by foreigners in the coastal zone has encouraged piracy by the local 
population.36  
 
PMSCs are employed to protect ships and crews against any kind of violent attacks 
and attempted hijackings on the high seas and even in coastal waters. During on-going 
attacks, the contractors do not distinguish between pirates, bandits, insurgents or terrorists. 
They will try to repel the attackers as quickly and effectively as possible. In this paper, it is 
argued that pirates are the main threat for the global shipping industry. Therefore, this 
analysis will be based exclusively on protection against pirate attacks under the UNCLOS 
definition, even though it can be argued that the majority of piratical acts do occur in 
territorial waters and ports.37 In cases, where actions or examples are qualified as robberies or 
other kind of attacks, this will be specifically outstated.  
  
b) The causes for piracy 
Piracy has become a highly lucrative business in certain areas of the world. The Horn of 
Africa, particularly the coast of Somalia, the Gulf of Guinea, the Indian Ocean, as well as the 
                                                 
33 Skaridov in Long et al., Legal Challenges in Maritime Security, 2008, p. 481 (hereafter: Author in Long et al.). 
34 De Than Claire & Shorts, Edwin, International Criminal Law and Human Rights, 2003, p. 261(hereafter: De 
Than & Shorts); Franciconi & Ronzitti, p. 39; Geiβ & Petrig, p. 61. 
35 Geiβ & Petrig, p. 65f.; Wolfrum in Long et al., p. 7ff.  
36 Geiβ & Petrig, p. 9. 
37 Hohenstein, James H., ‘Private Security Companies at Sea: Unseen and Unregulated’, International Bar 
Association, Sinagapore, Maritime and Aviation Law Section, Maritime and Transport Law Committee, Session: 
Piracy and Crimes at Sea including Pollution Liability, 18 October 2007, p. 2 (hereafter: Hohenstein). 
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Malacca and the Singapore straits are the most affected water routes for ships, called high risk 
areas (HRA).38 
The main causes are manifold and complex. From a security and economic perspective, 
coastal countries such as Somalia, Indonesia and the Philippines, they remain highly 
unstable.39 States are unable to control their territorial waters due to a lack of naval or coast 
guard fleets.40 The absence of an effective executive and judicial system allows the pirates to 
have their bases on land and to prepare their attacks from land. People in countries like 
Somalia are simply desperate and used to war due to on-going regional conflicts, making 
Somalia a perfect environment for piracy to thrive.41 Another factor supporting piracy is the 
availability of light weapons in wider East Africa, which facilitates the work of pirates to 
board and hold even the largest ocean-going carriers. In addition, the willingness of ship 
owners to pay ransoms and the amount of ships which lack safety measures strongly 
encourages the piracy industry.42 Therefore, the shipping industry faces serious threats to 
ships, crew and cargo when traversing the high risk areas and the demand for protection has 
risen significantly in the last two decades. 
 
2. The naval response of the international community  
The rapid increase in armed attacks on sea resulted in a set-up of various national and 
multinational naval counter-piracy operations. The main naval multinational operations 
include the Combined Task Force 151, mainly consisting of frigates from the U.S. and the 
U.K., the European Operation ATALANTA and the NATO Operation Ocean Shield.43 Apart 
from these, a number of other States have sent warships to protect and/ or escort shipping in 
the Horn of Africa.44 But the use of these initiatives faces two major problems. On the one 
                                                 
38 Menefee in Long et al., p. 445f. 
39 Brown, James, ‘Pirates And Privateers: Managing The Indian Ocean's Private Security Boom’, Lowy Institute 
for International Policy Analysis, 2012, p. 4 (hereafter: Brown); Hohenstein, p. 3. 
40 Franciconi & Ronzitti, p. 37; Mahard, p. 338f. 
41 Chalk, Peter, Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Scope, Dimensions, Causes and Responses, Brown Journal of 
World Affairs, 2010, p. 94 (hereafter Chalk). 
42 Chalk, p. 94-96. 
43 In detail: Geiβ & Petrig, part 1, chapter II, section A. 




hand, they are far too small to monitor the high risk areas and the vast number of vessels 
traversing the region. Only 20 frigates are deployed in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, 
which have to patrol an area ten-times the size of Germany.45 One American politician stated 
that not even all the navies of all the countries of the world would be able to cover the seas off 
of the East African nation’s shores.46 In addition, the pirates expand their operational area far 
into the Indian Ocean to avoid an interference of the naval ships.47 
On the other hand, the cost of the military deployment is estimated to be more than $ 1.25 
billion for 2011 and is thereby a burden on the decreasing spending’s for defence in many 
European governments.48 Therefore, it can be concluded that the naval operations cannot 
serve as an effective long-term solution for the problem. 
Besides that, several different approaches were introduced to fight piracy, mainly in 
the coordination counter-piracy mechanisms and in the criminal repression of piracy and 
armed robbery at Sea.49 For example, a Contact Group off the Coast of Somalia was built up 
to address the regional situation. Regarding the criminal prosecution, Kenya entered into 
agreements with the U.S., the U.K. and the EU to serve as a third-party prosecutor for 
individuals suspected of maritime crimes.50 
But these approaches do not serve as an overall solution for the piracy problem. They might 
help to oppose the problem, but do not efficiently prevent ships from being attacked.  
 
3. Categorisation of the PMSC industry 
The limitations and problems of counter-piracy naval forces have not only allowed piracy to 
continue, but have also created the conditions for a private response. The use of PMSCs rose 
                                                 
45 Brown, p. 4f.; Coito, p. 180f.; Priddy, Alice and Casey-Maslen, Stuart, ‘Counter-Piracy operations by 
PMSC's’, Journal of International Criminal justice, 2012, p. 1 (hereafter : Priddy & Casey-Maslen);  
Spearin, p. 824. 
46 Ake, David C., Defense Official: More Private Security Needed Aboard Ships to Combat Piracy, National 
Defense, 16 June 2011, available under 
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?List=7c996cd7-cbb4-4018-baf8-
8825eada7aa2&ID=447 (last seen: 27 August 2015). 
47 Coito, p. 180; Geiβ & Petrig, p. 35; Spearin, p. 824. 
48 Brown, p. 5; Mahard, p. 341f.; Priddy & Casey-Malsen, p. 1. 
49 Chalk p. 98. 
50 Chalk, p. 98. 
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significantly since 2008.51 It is difficult to determine how many individual private security 
contractors are currently working in the Indian Ocean, as there is no central registry for their 
licensing or qualification.52  About 40 per cent of the 42,500 ships that transited HRA in 2012 
used armed guards, compared to 15 per cent the year before.53  
The hiring of private guards seems reasonable when looking at the risk of hijackings. 
Companies lose millions in foregone chartering income while their vessels are held to ransom. 
They also suffer from high costs in hiring specialist ransom negotiators, lawyers, and support 
for crews once released. Hiring a highly equipped protection team for between $10, 000 and 
$100,000 for a passage is a comparatively small price to pay to avoid these costs.54 
Additionally, the costs of a detour around the Cape of Good Hope to avoid the Gulf of Aden 
are enormous.55 Another problem is that insurance companies have increased insurance 
premiums over the last years to reflect the dangers of piracy, by calling the HRA “war-risk 
zones”.56 Some insurance companies now tend to lower the premiums for vessels having 
PCASP on board while passing through HRA.57 However, the strongest argument for the use 
of PMSCs remains the fact and often-chanted mantra that no ship has yet been successfully 
hijacked which employed armed guards.58  
Consequently, the use of PMSCs presents a fiscally sound solution to the problem of piracy 
and armed robbery for the shipping industry. 
In the meantime, the use of armed security guards remains highly controversial in the 
world of maritime commerce. Especially the International Maritime Organisation59 (IMO), 
the International Chamber of Commerce’s International Maritime Bureau60 and the 
                                                 
51 Brown, p. 6; Coito, p. 181; PMSC were even used at the Volvo Ocean Race in 2011 to protect the high-tech 
yachts, see: The Australian, ‘Volvo ocean race uses armed ship for pirates’, 29 December 2011, available at: 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/volvoocean-race-uses-armed-ship-for-pirates/storye6frg6so-
1226232732198 ( last seen 15 July 2015). 
52 Brown, p. 6. 
53 Wiese & Katz, ʽShooting to Kill Pirates Risks Blackwater Moment‘. 
54 Hohenstein, p. 11; Mahard, p. 341; Spearin, p. 828. 
55 Coito, p. 180. 
56 Chalk, p. 93f.; Mahard, p. 340. 
57 Brown, p. 6. 
58 Mahard, p. 341; Priddy & Casey-Maslen, p. 840. 
59 Hereafter: IMO 
60 Hereafter: IMB 
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International Chamber of Shipping disapprove of the employment of PMSCs.61 Concerns 
include the fear of an escalation of violence, the risk of personal injury or damage to ship and 
cargo and issues of liability.62 Additional costs will uprise in cases of crimes committed by 
armed guards or if the use of PMSC guards collides with domestic legislations, in the worst 
case leading to a loss of the ship’s insurance cover.63 Moreover, worries about operational 
problems exist, especially in areas like command and control, rules of engagement, the use of 
deadly force, weapon security and intra port/ship transfer of weapons and guards.64  
Further concerns remain about eventual incidents on the open water involving PMSC. It is 
difficult to gather evidence on, and adjudicate, operations on the High Seas compared to land-
based operations. On reputation, potential clients might shy away from shippers that employ 
PMSCs in a haphazard, unrestrained way. 65  
But over the last years, all major shipping industry groups have accepted that PMSCs are an 
elementary part of the global response to piracy, and they have acknowledged that many 
shipping companies were using PMSCs.66  
 
4. Are PMSCs a temporary phenomenon?  
Interestingly, the number of piratical attacks has declined off the horn of Africa for various 
reasons, the vast use of PCASP being one of them.  In 2014, no ship was successfully 
hijacked in the coast off Somalia.67 245 actual and attempted attacks of piracy and armed 
                                                 
61 Coito, p. 181. 
62 Brown, p. 6; Coito, p. 182f; Spearin, p. 833. 
63 Koenig & Salomon, p. 15. 
64 Koch, Christopher, Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation  
regarding “International Piracy on the High Seas”, 04 February 2009, p. 5, Fn. 4; see also Sekimizu, Koji, 
Maritime Safety Committee, 90th session, Opening address, 16 May 2012, available at: 
http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/SecretaryGeneral/Secretary-
GeneralsSpeechesToMeetings/Pages/msc90highlevel.aspx (last seen: 20 August 2015). 
65 Spearin, p. 832. 
66 Brown, p. 6. 
67 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the situation with respect to piracy and 
armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, S/2014/740 , 16 October 2014; 
Katzenellenbogen, Jonathan, ‘Has Somali Piracy ended?’ defenceWeb, 06  February 2015, available at: 
http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=37870:has-somali-piracy-
ended&catid=108:maritime-security&Itemid=233 (last seen: 15 July 2015). 
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robbery were reported in 2014.68 Generally, attacks have moved from the Gulf of Aden into 
the Gulf of Guinea and into waters of South-East Asia.69 But with the on-going regional crisis, 
e.g. the civil war in Yemen and high pirate activities in other parts of the world, the problem 
has not disappeared.70 The use of PMSCs will continue to play a significant role in maritime 
security, especially with shrinking defence budgets reducing naval presence. In June 2015, it 
was estimated by the Baltic and International Maritime Council71 and the European Union 
Naval Force that the percentage of vessels carrying PCASP is still around 35-40% although 
team sizes have dropped from 4 to 3 and in some cases only two team members.72 
Interestingly, over the last years one can also recognise a shift from in the nationalities of the 
team members from Anglo Saxon, which are expensive, to other cheaper nationalities such as 
Eastern Europeans, Indians and Filipinos.73 
Regarding the on-going employment of PCASP, an analysis of the existing legal regimes for 
the use of these contractors on the High Sea is required. In the next chapter, the attempts of 
the international community to create a legal framework in order to govern the branch will be 
illustrated and the possibilities of the use of already existing maritime law for the same 
purpose will be shown. 
 
III. PMSCs under international law 
International law consists of a broad variety of codified rules and permanently developing 
custom. The International Humanitarian Law, also known as the ius in bello, is a set of norms 
regulating combat.74 Certain rules from the Humanitarian Law could be applicable to regulate 
the branch of Private Maritime Security Companies. But first, it shall be analysed if the fact 
                                                 
68 ICC International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery against ships, Report for 2014, p. 5, available 
at: https://icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/request-piracy-report (last seen: 28 September 2015).  
69Cook, Peter,  Interview, Founder & Director at Security Association for the Maritime Industry (SAMI), 
London, United Kingdom, 15 September 2015, Comment to Slide 2 (hereafter: Cook, Interview); ICC 
International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery against ships, Report for 2014, p. 6. 
70 Mahard, p. 367. 
71 Hereafter: BIMCO 
72 Cook, Interview, Comment to Slide 1. 
73 Cook, Interview, Comment to Slide 1. 
74 Bennett & Strug, p. 400. 
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that piracy itself is a universally judicable crime can be taken as a legal foundation for private 
actors to fight piracy.  
 
1. Pirates as hostis humani generis75 
Any nation may prosecute pirates, even in the absence of a nexus between the pirate attack 
and the State claiming jurisdiction.76 Piracy is universally judicable, the reason for the 
universal jurisdiction can be based on a specific characteristic, namely the special locus delicti 
of piracy, the ‘high seas’, where every State has an interest in its own safety, but none has 
jurisdiction.77  
Nearly every State is a potential victim of maritime depredations and the security of the free 
flow of international trade has always been a common interest of the international community. 
Consequently, it is certain that universal jurisdiction exists over piracy.78 But the universal 
jurisdiction only provides a mechanism for instituting criminal proceedings against persons 
who have allegedly engaged in piracy attacks. The deployment of armed guards and the use of 
force to prevent the attacks are not covered by the institute of universal jurisdiction. Hence, it 
cannot be taken as a legal foundation for the use of PMSCs on the High Seas. 
 
2. International Humanitarian Law  
a) Piracy as an armed conflict within the Geneva Conventions 
Generally, International Humanitarian Law sets out rules for conduct in armed conflict. 
Armed conflicts exist whether there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted 
armed violence between governmental authorities and organised armed groups within a 
State.79 Traditionally, armed conflicts are divided into two categories, international armed 
conflicts80 and non-international armed conflicts.81 
                                                 
75 Latin for “enemies of the human race”. 
76 De Than & Shorts, p. 257. 
77 Geiβ & Petrig, p. 147. 
78 Geiβ & Petrig, p. 147. 
79 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Decision of the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 
02 October 1995, para. 70; International Committee of the Red Cross Opinion Paper, ‘How is the term "Armed 
Conflict" defined in international humanitarian law?’ March 2008, p. 1 (in short: ICRC Opinion Paper), available 
at: https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf (last seen: 01 August 2015). 
80 In short: IAC 
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The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the subsequent protocols aim to govern the 
actions of belligerents in armed conflicts.82 The Conventions contain rules about the 
obligations of governments to treat humanely civilians, prisoners of war, and those wounded 
in battle.83  
Art. 2 and 3 of the Geneva Convention I require for IACs the involvement of two or 
more opposing States. Pirates are not employed or hired by a national government; they 
cannot be seen as State actors. Therefore piracy on the High Seas is not classified as an IAC. 
Art. 3 of the Geneva Convention I defines an NIAC as an ‘armed conflict not of an 
international character occurring in the territory of a State’.84 The conflict has to occur 
between governmental armed forces and the forces of one or more armed groups, or between 
such groups. Moreover, two further elements are required. The conflict has to reach a 
minimum level of intensity and non-state actors involved must be parties to the conflict, 
meaning they are an armed force sufficiently organised to sustain military operations.85 
The minimum level of intensity is a vague term, but one has to examine factors such as the 
number, duration and intensity of individual confrontations, the types of weapons used or the 
number of casualties.86   
                                                                                                                                                        
81 Lubell, Noam, Extraterritorial Use of Force against Non-State Actors, 2010, p. 93 (hereafter Lubell); non-
international armed conflicts hereafter: NIAC). 
82 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 
12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950  (hereafter: Geneva Convention I); Geneva Convention for 
the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded and Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 12 
August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950 (hereafter: Geneva Convention II); Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949, 6 entered into force 21 October 1950, (hereafter: 
Geneva Convention III); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 
August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950 (hereafter: Geneva Convention IV); Protocols Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International and Non-
International Armed Conflicts, 12 December 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978 (hereafter: Protocol I); 
Bennett & Strug, p. 402. 
83 Parsons, Dana M., ‘Protecting the Booty: Creating a Regulatory Framework to Govern Increased Use of 
Private Security Companies in the Fight against Pirates’, Tulane Maritime Law Journal, 2010, p. 171, (hereafter 
Parsons). 
84 See also: The Manual on the Law of Non International Armed Conflict, International Institute of 
Humanitarian Law, San Remo, 2006, Definition of a non-international armed conflict, 1.1.1. 
85 ICRC Opinion Paper,p. 3; Coito, p. 207.  
86 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Decision of the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ICTY, 
02 October 1995, para 69f.; Coito, p. 209. 
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With multiple governments involved in counter-piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden, 
one could assume that the Somali pirate attacks can be classified as a NIAC from one armed 
group against governmental armed forces. But it is, questionable if these requirements are 
fulfilled in the context of modern piracy. 
First of all, pirates do not attack other armed groups or naval forces, they are groups of private 
actors whose attacks are solely motivated by financial gains. 
Secondly, piracy the definition of art. 101 UNCLOS takes place on the High Seas, not within 
the territory of a country, such as Somalia.  
Regarding the level of intensity, it can be said that pirate attacks occur briefly and do 
mostly not lead to on-going armed fighting. Looking at the types of weapons, pirates normally 
use AK-74 assault rifles, pistols and sometimes rocket propelled grenade launchers.87 At least 
the assault rifles and the rocket launchers could be seen as instruments which can cause high 
number of casualties and heavy damages. Nevertheless, the actual number of casualties 
occurring from pirate attacks is relatively low compared to other on-going conflicts. 
Generally, the attacks of pirates declined significantly over the last years.88 As a result, the 
frequent piracy attacks do not reach the required level of intensity. 
Finally, the pirate groups would have to be classified as armed forces sufficiently organised to 
sustain military operations. Even though the groups have some degree of organisation, 
command structures and leadership, this organisation is not sufficient of itself.89 Their attacks 
are not coordinated in a military operational mode; the raids and hijackings are occur 
individually and can be compared to acts of bandits or robbers. Also the historic treatment of 
pirates as criminals rather than prisoners of war supports the argument that they cannot be 
seen as combatants of an organised armed group.90 
Taking everything into consideration, one can state that piracy nowadays cannot be regarded 
as an on-going armed conflict with a certain intensity of violence, which is required for a 
NIAC in art. 3 Geneva Convention I. 
                                                 
87 Koch, Christopher, Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation  
regarding “International Piracy on the High Seas”, 04 February 2009, p. 3, available at 
http://www.worldshipping.org/pdf/wsc_piracy_testimony_feb_2009_2.pdf (last seen: 20 August 2015) ; Mahard, 
p. 339. 
88 See p. 13. 
89 Coito, p. 211; Guilfoyle, Douglas, ‘The Laws of War and the Fight against Somali Piracy: Combatants or 
Criminals?’ Melbourne Journal of International Law, 2010, p. 141 (hereafter: Guilfoyle). 
90 Coito, p. 211. 
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As a conclusion, modern piracy cannot be classified as an international armed conflict 
or a non-international armed conflict. Therefore, most documents of International 
Humanitarian Law are not applicable. Especially, the Geneva Conventions and its subsequent 
protocols are not applicable for the use of PMSCs in vessel protection operations, because the 
requirement of an armed conflict is not fulfilled. 
In general, it can be discussed whether the Geneva Conventions extend to the actions of PSC 
on land contracted by governments. Nevertheless, PMSCs are employed by shipping 
companies, not by governments. The Geneva Conventions and its subsequent protocols are 
therefore not applicable for the typical work of the maritime security sector. 
 
b) The Montreux Document  
The Montreux Document of 2008 is the first international approach to codify and regulate the 
conduct of Private Military and Security Companies. It is a non-binding document, which 
neither creates nor alters legal obligations, but illuminates existing requirements pertinent to 
private security operations.91 
The Montreux Document addresses the use of PSCs by States during armed 
conflicts.92 In addition, it recognises the possibility that it might be applied as standard for 
good practice in comparable situations. 93 While the creation of the Montreux Document 
signals a move to regulate PSC’s hired by governments, the use of PSC’s by private entities 
has received little attention.94 However in the explanatory comments, the use of PMSCs to 
protect merchant shipping against piracy is expressly mentioned as a context where the 
document offers practical guidance.95  Additionally, the drafters stated that ‘good practices 
may be of value for entities such as international organisations, NGO’s and companies.’96 
Therefore, the Document can to certain extent function as a reminder for Territorial States, 
Home States and privately contracted armed security personnel (PCASP) for their existing 
international legal obligations and provide guidance for the use of PMSCs. But as a non-
                                                 
91 Montreux Document, preface, Nr. 3. 
92 Montreux Document, preface, Nr. 2. 
93 Montreux Document, preface, Nr. 5. 
94 Parsons, p. 174. 
95 Montreux Document, Explanatory Comments, Questions and answers on the Montreux Document, When does 
the Montreux Document apply? 
96 Montreux Document, preface, Nr. 8. 
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binding document, it has only a limited value and cannot be seen as a legal foundation for the 
regulation of PMSCs. 
The Classification of the Montreux Document as international customary law can be 
tested. International custom can be defined as a certain pattern of behaviour (usus) 
consistently observed over a period of time, thereby creating an expectation in the wider 
community that it will be repeated in the future.97 
In detail, two requirements have to be fulfilled, the state practice and opinio iuris.  
The Document has currently 52 signatory States, which shows that it is widely accepted in the 
international community.98 But for the usus, the rules need ‘a constant and uniform usage 
practised by the States in question’.99 And ‘the conduct of States should in general be 
consistent with such rules’.100 There is no information if all the signatory States comply with 
all the mentioned obligations. Furthermore, the Montreux Document is a relatively new 
framework which functions more as a reminder than as an obligatory set of rules. Preface Nr. 
3 and Nr. 4 of the Document clearly point out that the paper is a non-legally binding 
instrument and does create new obligations for States under international law. The 
introduction of Part Two of the Document also States that ‘no State has the legal obligation to 
implement any particular good practice’. Therefore, the rules of the Montreux Document 
cannot be seen as custom. 
 
c) Draft International Convention on the Regulation, Oversight and Monitoring 
Of Private Military and Security Companies 
In 2009, a Draft International Convention on the Regulation, Oversight and Monitoring of 
Private Military and Security Companies101 was published by a working group of the U.N. 
Commission on Human Rights. 
                                                 
97 Art. 38 (1) (b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, adopted on 26 June 1945; Bennett & Strug, 
p. 14. 
98 Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, available at 
https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/fdfa/foreign-policy/international-law/international-humanitarian-law/private-
military-security-companies/participating-states.html (last seen: 30 July 2015). 
99 ICJ, Asylum Case (Colombia v Peru) 1950, ICJ Rep 266, para 276f. 
100 ICJ, Nicaragua Case (Nicaragua v US) 1986. ICJ Rep 14, para 186. 
101 Draft International Convention on the Regulation, Oversight and Monitoring 
Of Private Military and Security Companies, drafted on 13 July 2009. 
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The Convention aims to establish a national and international legal regime to resolve 
questions of standards under which Private Military and Security Companies should operate 
and how to oversee their activities. In Article 2 (c) of the Draft, security services are defined 
as armed guarding or protection of buildings, installations, property and people, police 
training, material and technical support to police forces, elaboration and implementation of 
informational security measures and other related activities. Vessels and cargo are owned by 
shipping companies, other legal entities or private persons and are therefore property. PCASP 
are hired to protect ships, cargo and their crew. Their employment falls into the category of 
security services leading to an applicability of the Draft.  
 
But the International Convention on the Regulation, Oversight and Monitoring 
Of Private Military and Security Companies is only a working draft, not a final set of rules. Its 
regulations can only be seen as proposals and guidance but are not yet legally binding. Hence, 
it does not provide legal foundations for the use of PMSCs.  
 
d) Are PMSC employees mercenaries? 
International Law provides various rules for the use of mercenaries in conflict situations. 
PMSC’s contractors could possibly fit into the definition of mercenaries.  
Art. 1 of the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training 
of Mercenaries102 defines a mercenary as any person who: 
  
1. (a)  Is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict; 
     
(b)  Is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private 
    gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a party to the conflict, material   
    compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to                
    combatants of  similar rank and functions in the armed forces of that party; 
     
(c)  Is neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a resident of 
    territory controlled by a party to the conflict; 
     
                                                 
102 U.N. International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, adopted 
on 4 December 1989, entered into force on 20 October 2001 (hereafter: U.N. Mercenary Convention). 
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(d)  Is not a member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict; and 
     
(e)  Has not been sent by a State which is not a party to the conflict on 
    official duty as a member of its armed forces. 
   
2.   A mercenary is also any person who, in any other situation: 
    
(a)  Is specially recruited locally or abroad for the purpose of 
   participating in a concerted act of violence aimed at: 
  
 (i)  Overthrowing a Government or otherwise undermining the 
          constitutional order of a State; or 
  
 (ii)  Undermining the territorial integrity of a State; 
  
 (b)  Is motivated to take part therein essentially by the desire for 
     significant private gain and is prompted by the promise or payment 
     of material compensation; 
     
(c)  Is neither a national nor a resident of the State against which such 
     an act is directed; 
      
(d)  Has not been sent by a State on official duty; and 
     
(e)  Is not a member of the armed forces of the State on whose territory 
     the act is undertaken. 
 
The prerequisites of art. 1 (1) of the U.N. Mercenary Convention are not fulfilled because of 
the missing classification of piracy as an armed conflict. 
Furthermore, art. 1 (2) of the U.N. Mercenary Convention contains rules applicable for 
concerted acts of violence aimed at overthrowing a government or otherwise undermining the 
constitutional order of a State or undermining the territorial integrity of a State. PMSC 
employees are used to protect ships, the crew and cargo. They do not actively participate in 
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co-ordinated attacks, especially not against a State or a certain government.103 The 
prerequisites of art. 1 (2) U.N. Mercenary Convention are also not met. 
The definition of mercenarism in Art. 47(2) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conventions is very similar. Hence, the Protocol is not applicable for the same reasons. 
 
The structure of PMSCs and mercenaries differs widely. Maritime Security 
Companies are organised as business corporations, whereas mercenaries are rarely structured 
and mostly operate as individuals.104 Although both PMSCs and mercenaries are profit driven, 
PMSCs profit motivation relates to business profit rather than individual profit. Furthermore 
PMSCs compete openly on the global market, whereas mercenaries shy away from publicity 
in order to avoid national and international anti-mercenary laws. 
In conclusion, PMSC personnel cannot be equated with mercenaries, either from a legal or a 
more practical point of view. Therefore, the mentioned legal regulations, especially the U.N. 
Mercenary Convention are inapplicable.  
 
3. Are S.C. resolutions a legal basis for the use of PMSCs?  
Over the last decades, the U.N. Security Council has released 14 resolutions concerning the 
fight against piracy. 12 resolutions targeted the fight on piracy off the coast of Somalia and 
two dealt with piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.105  
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The resolutions suggest different methods to fight piracy and armed robbery on the sea, based 
on Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.106 
The latest Resolution 2125107 from 2013 calls upon States to use all available means in the 
repression and disruption of piratical activity off the coast of Somalia. In addition, it sets out 
the relevant provisions of the UNCLOS (arts. 100, 101, 105) to be used as legal grounds for 
combating piracy. 
Interestingly, the Resolution also notes the use of privately contracted armed security 
personnel.108 It encourages flag States and port States to regulate such activities in accordance 
with applicable international law and permits charters to favour arrangements that make use 
of such measures, through a consultative process.109 
Resolution 2125 is legally binding because it is issued under Chapter VII about Action with 
Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression, of the 
Charter.110 But the content of the Resolution 2125 concerning PCASP only suggests States to 
regulate the PMSC sector. It does not contain specific rules or guidance about the use of 
private contractors. The only thing that can be noted out of the Resolution is the general 
acknowledgement of the Security Council of PCASP on the high seas. Additionally, the 
necessity of the Council to regulate this field demonstrates that worries about the use of 
PCASP exist due to a lack of existing control mechanisms. 
To sum up, the Security Council Resolutions do not offer legal foundations for the sector of 
private maritime security.   
 
4. Interim conclusion 
By looking at the different sources from international humanitarian law, one can summarise 
that an explicit regulation of PMSCs does not exist. There are rules concerning similar matters 
such as general private security companies and non-binding documents, such as the Montreux 
                                                 
106 Charter of the United Nations, adopted on 26 June 1945 and entered into force on 24 October 1945 (hereafter: 
Charter of the United Nations). 
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Document, but the maritime sector has not been covered yet. Hence, one has to take a look 
into other international laws and instruments to find rules about the use of PMSCs. 
 
 
IV. PMSCs in the scope of UNCLOS 
1. The question of locale 
a) The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas  
This chapter aims to find out if the UNCLOS contains rules about the ship owners’ use of 
privately contracted armed security personnel (PCASP) and which rules could be applied for 
the conduct of armed guards. For this purpose, the significance of the UNCLOS will be 
presented, and the different rules for ships when travelling through territorial waters, 
international straits, on the high seas and in ports will be outlined. Afterwards, the issues of 
the carriage of weapons and the use of force under UNCLOS will be scrutinized.  
In 1982, the drafters of UNCLOS wanted to create an effective international regime 
over the seabed and the ocean floor beyond a clearly defined national jurisdiction.111 The 
Convention codified existing rules of the sea and was adopted on 12 December 1982. At 
present, the treaty has 167 signatory parties.112 However, certain States have signed but not 
ratified the Convention; the Unites States for example has signed the treaty but not ratified it 
and is therefore not bound by it. With respect to the high risk areas it is noteworthy that in the 
Gulf of Aden Somalia, the Seychelles, Kenya, the United Republic of Tanzania, Djibouti and 
Yemen have all signed and ratified the Convention; concerning the Gulf of Guinea, all States 
with coastlines are members of UNCLOS, the same counts for the Asian high risk areas113 
 
                                                 
111 See Preamble of  UNCLOS. 
112 United Nations, Chronological lists of ratifications of, accessions and successions to the Convention and 
 the related Agreements, 07 January 2015, available at: 
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b) The law of the coastal State, international straits and the meaning of innocent passage  
Vessels with armed security guards on board may encounter problems when navigating 
through numerous territorial seas because the sovereignty of a coastal State extends beyond its 
land territory and internal waters according to art. 2 UNCLOS. 
 
aa) Meaning of innocent passage   
Generally, art. 17 UNCLOS grants the right of innocent passage by saying that ships of all 
States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy the right of innocent passage through the 
territorial sea of another State. Art. 19 UNCLOS sets preconditions for an innocent passage. 
Art. 19 (1) UNCLOS states that a passage is innocent as long as it is not prejudicial to the 
peace, good order or security of the coastal State. Art. 19 (2) UNCLOS lists the following 
activities as prejudicial to the peace, good order or security which could be infringed by the 
use of PMSCs: 
(a) any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political 
independence of the coastal State, or in any other manner in violation of the 
principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations; 
(b) any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind; 
 (…) 
(f) the launching, landing or taking on board of any military device; 
      (…) 
 
The use of armed guards could be seen as a threat to the sovereignty, territorial integrity or 
political independence of the coastal State.114 But it has to be mentioned that the numbers of 
PCASP per ship are low, which can be estimated with around 4 per ship,115 though their 
employment cannot be seen as a possible threat because they are not armed with heavy 
weapons which can affect the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of a 
State. Furthermore, they are equipped to defend the ship, rather than to board other vessels or 
to carry out amphibious operations.  
The pure use of armed guards on board of a ship could already be regarded as a 
practice with weapons of any kind, which is contradictory to art. 19 (2) (b) UNCLOS. But 
already the wording of the paragraph using “…exercise or practice with weapons…” is an 
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argument that only actions related to the use of weapons, for example the firing of bullets, are 
included by the drafters. If the drafters would have wanted to prohibit the employment of 
armed persons on board, they could have used detailed terms such as “hiring” “employing” or 
“using” armed personnel instead of “exercise” or ”practice”. The mere carriage of weapons, 
locked or stowed, cannot be seen as an “exercise or practice.”116 
However, the armed guards could exercise or practice with their weapons in the 
territorial waters by actually firing their weapons. PCASP tend to practice hijacking scenarios 
and target shooting during their operations, because they need to be permanently ready and 
prepared to encounter sudden attacks. However, as long as they do it on the high seas and not 
in the territorial waters of a State, their manoeuvres and drills are not contradictory to the 
UNCLOS. Similarly, using a weapon in a self-defence situation against piracy or armed 
robbery attacks would also not classify as an “exercise or practice” because it would be a real 
self-defence situation, not a manoeuvre. Hence, there is no risk of a violation of art. 19 (2) (b) 
UNCLOS and a violation can clearly be avoided by practising outside the territorial waters. 
 A further forbidden activity is the launching, landing or taking on board of any 
military device, as art. 19 (2) (f) UNCLOS. PCASP must eventually embark, disembark, and 
load or offload weapons at a floating armoury or supply boats. Should these activities take 
place, especially via floating armoury or other vessel in a State’s territorial sea and without 
that coastal State’s permission, it may be considered as taking aboard a military device and 
thus a violation of innocent passage. Nevertheless, not all weapons, ammunition, and 
equipment can be seen as military devices. The term military can be defined as “relating to or 
characteristic of soldiers or armed forces”.117 Hence, the devices such as weapons and 
equipment must be of a kind which normally soldiers or armed forces use. Maritime Guards 
are armed for private security services, not for military operations. One has to distinguish 
between the different weapons and pieces of equipment commonly used by PCASP, not all of 
them will fit in the category of military devices. Bulletproof vests and semi-automatic rifles 
are not solely attributable to the military sector, automatic assault rifles, machine guns or 
grenades would be counted as military devices. A distinction must be assessed on a case-by-
case basis. Therefore, the prerequisites for the launching, landing or taking on board of any 
                                                 
116 Koenig, Doris & Salomon, Tim René ‚Private Sicherheitsdienste auf Handelsschiffen – Rechtliche 
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military device are not necessarily fulfilled if the ship with PCASP on-board merely traverses 
the territorial waters.  
 
bb) The law of the coastal State concerning innocent passage through its waters 
The use of armed guards on-board could contravene the laws and regulations of coastal States. 
For instance, a coastal State could totally prohibit the employment of PMSC personnel within 
its jurisdiction during the passage through its territorial waters or impose restrictions on the 
carriage of firearms.  
Nonetheless, art. 21 UNCLOS restrains the possibility for States to adopt laws and regulations 
relating to innocent passage by their unlimited choice. Art. 21 (1) UNCLOS provides a 
positive legal basis for the adoption of laws and regulations for coastal States. The provisions 
of art. 21 (1) (a) and (h) UNCLOS could be applicable as to regulations concerning the use of 
maritime security guards. However, none of these paragraphs deals with the employment of 
armed guards. 
Art. 21 (1) (a) UNCLOS concerns ‘the safety of navigation and the regulation of maritime 
traffic’. The rationale for this provision is exclusively the regulation of naval navigation and 
traffic.118 Regulations about the use of PMSCs do not fit into this category, their personnel 
does not affect naval navigation or traffic. 
Furthermore, the use of PMSC contractors does not fall under ‘the prevention of infringement 
of the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of the coastal State,’ as set 
out in article 21 (1) (h) UNCLOS. The pure use of armed guards during the transit of a ship 
through territorial waters does not affect any matters of customs, fiscal policies, immigration 
or sanitary protection. These fields are mainly influenced when vessels moor in a port, the 
crew disembarks and goods are unloaded. A small team of armed guards on-board a vessel 
during transit will not infringe any of the provisions mentioned above. Regulations about the 
use of PCASP therefore do not fit into the provision of article 21 (1) (a) and (h) UNCLOS. 
 As a result, one can say that coastal States generally do not have the possibility to 
restrict the use of PMSC personnel during transit under UNCLOS. Several UNCLOS rules 
allow the implementation of rules concerning the right to innocent passage, but only when 
certain requirements are fulfilled. The use of armed maritime guards cannot be regarded as 
one of the fields in which regulations are possible.   
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cc) Criminal jurisdiction on board a foreign ship  
Coastal States are empowered to exercise criminal jurisdiction on board a foreign ship passing 
through the territorial sea under certain requirements.119 This includes the arrest of any person 
and the conduct of any investigation in connection with any crime committed on board the 
ship during its passage. Generally, a State cannot exercise jurisdiction over ships passing 
through its waters, because the right to innocent passage has to be guaranteed and can only be 
limited under the prerequisites of art. 21 UNCLOS. The use of armed security guards would 
need to fulfil the requirements of art. 27 (1) UNCLOS to enable criminal jurisdiction. The 
employment of armed PCASP, if prohibited under national law of the coastal State, could be 
seen as a crime with consequences which extend to the coastal State or a crime of a kind to 
disturb the peace of the country or the good order of the territorial sea.120 
The pure employment cannot have any consequences for the coastal State. Normally, no 
consequences occur for the coastal State when ships with armed contractors on-board are 
solely traversing through territorial waters and do not call into a port.   
Nevertheless, one could claim that the use of PMSC personnel, if prohibited under the 
domestic law, could be a crime which disturbs the peace of the country or the good order of 
the territorial sea. Armed guards on-board merchant vessels could carelessly or intentionally 
damage other vessels with their weapons and thereby at least disturb the good order of the 
territorial sea. Armed guards definitely increase the risk of such incidents. Nevertheless, it is 
doubtful if the requirement of art. 27 (1) (b) UNCLOS can be fulfilled if weapons are only 
carried along the transit through the territorial waters. It is uncontested that the coastal State 
can exercise criminal jurisdiction in case of a use of these weapons against other vessels.121 
This would clearly demonstrate a disturbance of the good order of the territorial sea. But the 
mere possession of firearms on-board will usually do not lead to any disturbance.122  
Hence, the coastal State is not authorised by art. 27 UNCLOS to infringe the use of PMSC 
personnel on-board of merchant ships during the passage of its territorial waters.  
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dd)  The passage through international straits 
Another important set of rules in the UNCLOS concerns the passage through international 
straits. Under art. 37 UNCLOS, a strait is defined as a waterway which is ‘used for 
international navigation between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and 
another part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone’. Although art. 38 UNCLOS 
gives the right of transit passage to all ships and aircrafts through straits, the passage can be 
restricted by the regulations of art. 39 UNCLOS. According to art. 39 (1) (b) UNCLOS, ships 
shall refrain from any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or 
political independence of States bordering the strait or in any other manner in violation of the 
principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. As already 
argued, armed guards on ships do not present a threat to sovereignty, territorial integrity or 
political independence of States. Hence, ships with PCASP on-board should enjoy the right of 
transit passage through international Straits according to UNCLOS rules. 
The littoral States of the Straits, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore have each asserted claims 
of sovereignty over the Malacca and Singapore Straits.  Hence, the question arises over 
whether these waters might be construed as the territorial waters of those three States instead 
of simply an international strait. As a result, the rules about innocent passage through the 
territorial sea, art. 17ff. UNCLOS would be applicable. But even if these Straits would be 
regarded as territorial waters, the use of PMSC would still not contravene UNCLOS rules as 
shown above.123 
ee) Interim conclusion 
Vessels with armed security guards need to respect the rights and the sovereignty of the 
coastal States when navigating through numerous territorial seas and straits. But as long as 
they do not practise with weapons or take on board military devices, they enjoy the freedom 
of innocent passage through territorial seas and straits. Employed security teams should 
therefore be advised to limit their activities to surveillance and reconnaissance of the 
surrounding waters during the passage through coastal waters.  
 
c) The law of the flag State 
The high seas are open to all States under art. 87 UNCLOS, and no State may claim 
sovereignty over the high seas under art. 89 UNCLOS. Therefore it could be assumed that the 
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high seas are an unregulated, lawless area. But there are distinctive rules for the high seas in 
art 86ff. UNCLOS, and art. 88 UNCLOS reserves the high seas for peaceful purposes.  
The law of the flag State determines that a ship shall sail under the flag of one State 
only and that it should be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas.124Art. 94 (1) 
UNCLOS regulates that the State has the duty to effectively exercise its jurisdiction and 
control in administrative, technical and social matters over ships flying its flag. The 
nationality of ships also indicates which State is responsible in international law for the vessel 
in cases where an act of the vessel is attributable to the State, and which State is entitled to 
exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of the vessel.125 
Basically, the law of the flag state determines which legal regime PCASP have to 
follow.126 The regulations of PMSCs, the carrying of firearms on-board the vessel and general 
criminal matters are under the jurisdiction and control of the flag State.127 Thus, one has to 
look at the domestic law to find the legal framework for the use of PMSCs and all the issues 
concerning them. Most States throughout the world enable the use of security personnel on-
board under certain criteria.128 Interestingly, traditional sea powers such as China, the 
Netherlands and Portugal do not provide a legal basis for the use of armed guards, often 
relying solely on the protection by State navies.129 
However, a ship may fly a flag of a State different than that of the ship owners’, as a 
result nowadays ships commonly fly  a “flag of convenience”, meaning that the owners may 
choose to fly a flag of a State with laws and regulations of his favour, usually speaking about 
reduced operational costs. Shipping companies can take advantage of this approach to avoid 
strict laws regulating the use of PCASP, by choosing a flag State with relatively lax security 
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regulations.130 It is estimated that 60 per cent of ships fly flags different from the nationality 
of their owners.131 There are some countries which are commonly used as “flag of 
convenience States”, including Cyprus, Liberia, Malta, Marshall Islands, Panama or Sri 
Lanka. 132 A flag of convenience could theoretically authorise unqualified foreigners to act as 
PCASP on ships, and then shield them from prosecution if they commit crimes.  These States 
know that the international community is unwilling to impose military or economic sanctions 
on them, to prevent such abuses; therefore they have insufficient incentive to enforce better 
regulation on PMSC regulated issues.133 
In essence, flag States choose individually to support and enable the use of armed 
maritime guards. They need to implement domestic policies and laws to regulate the field of 
PMSCs and the possession of weapons on-board. Preferably, they would impose basic 
standards for the employment and regulate the use of force by armed guards. 
 
d) The law of the port State  
When a ship enters a port, it becomes subject to the laws of the port State.134 The laws and 
regulations of the port State decide if a ship may be anchored in a harbour or if violations of 
certain rules will be prosecuted.135 States show different attitudes towards the use of maritime 
guards. PMSC escorts are based in several countries; in 2013 they mainly operated from 
Djibouti, Sri Lanka, Oman or the United Arab Emirates.136 In contrast, governments such as 
from Nigeria, Togo or Benin and others around the Gulf of Guinea forbid the use of foreign 
PMSCs from operating within their jurisdiction.137 Other nations welcome them only if a 
certain amount of money was paid, which then again increases the financial burden for 
shipping companies.138  
 Usually, maritime nations accept the general principle of international comity. This 
principle means that matters of a vessel’s internal management and discipline are not subject 
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to local concerns or law.139 This principle is not based on the UNCLOS or other laws, but the 
general State practice of this rule is remarkably consistent.140 
In regard to armed guards, the principle would keep port authorities away from 
controlling vessels and would prevent them of realising that security personnel with firearms 
would be on-board. 
Nevertheless, when there is a disturbance, then it may be expected that the port State 
will intervene. The U.S. Supreme Court was confronted with a case concerning the principle 
of international comity in 1887. In the Wildenhus case141, a crew member on a Belgian vessel 
was killed on-board as a result of a conflict with other crew members while the ship was in 
the U.S. port of Jersey City, New Jersey. The Belgian consul applied for a writ of habeas 
corpus, after the alleged assailant Wildenhus was arrested, on the ground that a treaty granting 
exclusive charge to consuls for the internal order of the merchant vessels of their nation 
except where a disorder was of such a nature as to disturb tranquillity and public order on 
shore or in the port. The consul appealed the judgment after the circuit court refusal to release 
Wildenhus. The Supreme Court upheld the denial of the writ, stating: 
 
From experience, however, it was found long ago that it would be beneficial to 
commerce if local government would abstain from interfering with the internal 
discipline of the ship, and the general regulation of the rights and duties of the officers 
and crew towards the vessel, or among themselves. And so by comity it came to be 
generally understood among civilised nations that all matters of discipline, and all 
things done on board, which affected only the vessel, or those belonging to her, and 
did not involve the peace of dignity of the country, or the tranquillity of the port, 
should be left by the local government to be dealt with by the authorities of the nation 
to which the vessel belonged as the laws of that nation, or the interests of its 
commerce should require. But, if crimes are committed on board of a character to 
disturb the peace and dignity of the country to which the vessel has been brought, the 
offenders have never, by comity or usage, been entitled to any exemption from the 
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operation of the local laws for their punishment, if the local tribunals see fit to asset 
their authority.142 
The decision of the U.S. Supreme Court is obviously not binding in international law, but the 
dictum can be used for determining an international rule of law as a national judicial 
decision.143 Based on this decision, one can conclude that if PMSC employees were protecting 
a vessel in port and became engaged in a fire fight to defend the vessel, their conduct would 
be subject to the jurisdiction of the domestic law.144 
Furthermore it could be concluded that the use of arms in port of a State outside the ship or 
from the ship on external targets falls under the sovereignty of the port State. Moreover, one 
could say that a State has a vast and legitimate interest to decrease the risk of weapons on 
board commercial vessels and to be able to control that risk. Combined with the permanent 
threat of international terrorism, States could tend to exercise local jurisdiction over foreign 
ships. On the other hand, port States in Africa, such as Somalia or Liberia suffer from poor 
legislation and control over their Ports. PCASP will not often fear the enforcement of strict 
laws in these areas.  
 
As a result, PCASP should in most areas be advised to lock away their weapons and 
ammunition when anchoring in port and to rely on the protection by local police or security 
forces, especially when strict gun laws exist in the portal State. Still, in most cases, local 
authorities won’t even notice the employment of PMSC personnel and during a shore leave 
they will possibly be difficult to distinguish from ordinary crew members. Moreover, the 
principle of international comity will restrain local authorities from specifically looking for 
them or seizing ships. Therefore, vessels using armed teams can enter different ports, even if 
it is illegal under domestic law. 
 
e) Result 
To sum up, for the employment of armed guards it is important to distinguish between the 
different UNCLOS rules for each maritime zone. The law of the flag State may differ from 
regulations of coastal or port States. On the one hand, it can be summarised that the UNCLOS 
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does not include specific rules for the use of PMSC personnel on-board of commercial 
vessels.145 The Convention on the Law of the Seas addresses the problem of piracy in various 
articles and leaves piracy as a problem on a State level, with each sovereign State having the 
task to solve the problem. But on the other hand, it can be stated that the use of PMSCs is not 
addressed at all, meaning that their employment is not clearly prohibited. Still, the use of 
maritime PCASP remains complicated und jurisdictional questions maintain unresolved.146 
Sometimes port States in particular have strict rules on the employment of armed guards, so 
that one has to consider the different legal framework in each and every State. 
 
2. Carriage of weapons and the use of force under the UNCLOS  
In the previous chapter, general questions about existing legal foundations in the UNCLOS 
for the use of PMSCs were scrutinized. Next, existing rules for more specialised problems 
will be analysed, such as the carriage of weapons or the use of force by armed guards during 
pirate attacks. 
 
a) International regulation for the carriage of weapons  
A fundamental question of maritime security is the carriage of weapons on ships.  
Normally, vessels are seldom armed with anything other than fire axes and hoses.147 Often 
ship masters carry a small weapon for protection, which is generally located in the vessels 
safe.148   
Looking at international agreements and especially the UNCLOS as to firearms, there 
are currently no regulations addressing the carriage of such weapons on vessels.149 The 
carriage and use of firearms on the high seas is exclusively a matter which falls under the flag 
state of the vessel. In the territorial waters or the ports of other nations, one has to consider the 
laws of these nations, which vary widely. A number of countries, however, forbid the bearing 
of weapons on board or request to unload and lock them in a safe before entering a port of 
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call.150 In regard to anchoring in ports, the principle of comity may let coastal States hesitate 
to enforce domestic legislation for the carriage of weapons as long as the possession relates 
solely to the internal management of the ship and there is no incident.151 Nevertheless, this 
principle is not legally binding and this “tradition” might not be applicable to weapons used 
by PMSC personnel. However, the weapons that may lawfully be carried and used by the 
guards will vary widely from State to State. Different domestic jurisdictions require that either 
the weapons or the personnel carrying them, or both, be licensed under the law of the coastal 
State through which the ship is transiting. More often, there are import or export restrictions 
relating to the disembarkation of weapons in port.152 Furthermore, different approaches are in 
force to ensure that weapons are safely stored and delivered when a ship is in port, including 
gun-rental schemes whereby PMSC personnel can rent State owned firearms for a daily fee.153  
As of 2012, the Seychelles would send police aboard to lock vessels’ armouries during their 
time in port and authorities in Mauritius take firearms off civilian ships and hold them in 
safekeeping until departure.154Ships transiting through the Suez Canal with weapons have to 
submit documentation in advance specifying the kind of weapons and the security personnel 
aboard.155 
Therefore, maritime security providers try to evade coastal regulations on weapons in 
different ways. Firearms are sometimes simply dumped at sea before entering territorial 
waters and then purchased at a low price elsewhere.156 Occasionally, floating armouries are 
used which do not enter ports but stay on the high seas to supply contractors with firearms.157 
There are about 17-20 at sea today in three key points: Southern Red Sea, off the port of 
Fujairah and Sri Lanka.158 For instance, the PMSC Protection Vessels International used this 
method to prevent issues with coastal regulations. An event in 2010 showed that this practice 
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might be highly risky when four employees of Protection Vessels International were arrested 
by Eritrean authorities for storing military weapons and equipment on a remote island.159  
As a solution, relevant PMSC should be advised to have an understanding of port State and 
coastal State laws and requirements with respect to the possession, carriage, and movement of 
firearms, ammunition and other security related equipment, such as silencers, bulletproof 
vests, specialised communication equipment and infrared night-vision binoculars. 
  
b) Seizure of a pirate ship by PMSCs and the ‘letter of marquee’ 
aa) Seizure by warships 
UNCLOS deals with piracy in art. 100ff. Art. 105 functions as an authorisation to seize a 
pirate ship or aircraft on the high seas and to arrest the persons and seize the property on 
board. Art. 111 deals with the right of hot pursuit of a foreign ship. But these norms clearly 
indicate that only States may seize a pirate ship; private entities are expressis verbis not 
included. Art. 107 UNCLOS defines the ships and aircraft which are entitled to seize on 
account of piracy and art. 111 (5) UNCLOS lists the same for the right of hot pursuit. Only 
warships or military aircraft, or other ships or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being 
in government service and authorised to that effect are included.160 The definition of a 
warship can be found in art. 20 UNCLOS, as a ship belonging to the armed forces of a State 
bearing the external marks distinguishing such ships of its nationality, under the command of 
an officer duly commissioned by the government of the State and whose name appears in the 
appropriate service list or its equivalent and manned by a crew which is under regular armed 
forces discipline. 
Commercial vessels with on-board armed guards clearly do not fit into the category of 
warships.161 Usually, they are run by private entities, not by States, are not under the 
command of a military officer and its crews are not under the discipline of regular armed 
forces. Neither can private security escort vessels be regarded as warships due to their private 
employment, unless contractors are incorporated in the armed forces of a State.162 However in 
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legal terms, it is possible to convert a merchant vessel into a warship under the Hague 
Convention (VII) of 1907.163 According to art. 1 of the Hague Convention (VII) of 1907, 
the vessel must be placed under the direct authority, immediate control, and responsibility of 
the Power whose flag it flies. But in practice, one will barely find a commercial vessel under 
the command of an officer duly commissioned by the government of a State with a crew 
under military discipline.  
 
bb) Commercial ships and the ‘letter of marquee’ 
As a further option, a commercial vessel could be marked and identifiable as being on 
government service and authorised to seize pirates as set out in art. 107 UNCLOS. The reason 
for ships on government service on being included was that some States do not possess any 
warship and the amendment made it possible to have the seizure carried out by a vessel on a 
State service.164  The ownership of the ship by the State is not required nor is the presence of a 
commissioned officer demanded. The question arises if a PMSC could outfit a vessel for 
pirate hunting provided that it is commissioned to do so by a State and receives and 
authorisation to hunt pirates? This method was used in a similar form in former times and can 
be called  the issuing of ‘letters of marquee’.165 The first letter of marquee against pirates was 
already issued in the 15th century by the English King Henry VII.166 This method practically 
fits out and commissions a private vessel by the highest governmental authorities to hunt 
down pirates and recover their treasure.167  
 
In this process, several legal problems may occur. Normally, the exercise of these 
functions is carried out solely by governmental authorities, such as the hot pursuit, the right to 
visit a ship, seizure of goods and the detention of persons. The right of visit, for instance, is a 
State function and it is difficult to conceive that third States are ready to have their ships 
stopped and visited by a ship manned by PMSC personnel.168 Moreover, the use of privateers 
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in the maritime zone was officially abolished by the Paris Declaration respecting Maritime 
Law of 1856 because States bore in the mind the negative consequences of this approach.169 
And since the 19th century, State practice does not show any use of privateers, so that ‘letters 
of marquee’ could also be regarded as banned under international customary law.170 
 
Additionally, privateers could exceed their commission and governments could lose 
the control over private actors.171 The control mechanisms would be insufficient, gathering 
evidence from armed fights on the high seas is often difficult. Especially with regard to the 
misconduct of PMC employees in Iraq, there seems to be a high risk to issuing these ‘letters 
of marquee.’  
To sum up, the monopoly over seizing pirates on the high seas is held by State navies, 
not by private ships.172 One does not find a legal foundation for PMSC personnel to hunt 
pirates in the UNCLOS; neither do other sources of international law provide any 
authorisation. Arming vessels and hiring contractors for pirate hunting is in principle legally 
possible if the ship is on government service, authorised to chase pirates, and the hiring 
government bears international responsibility.173 Nevertheless, no practice of this kind exists 
to support such a finding.174 To the contrary, a hot pursuit of another ship and the detention of 
its crewmembers by PCASP without a State authorisation could itself constitute piracy under 
art. 101 UNCLOS.175  Therefore, PMSC should refrain from any offensive activities to pursue 
and arrest pirates.  
   
c) Seizure during self-defence and the detention of pirates?  
aa) The question of self-defence by PMSC employees 
PMSC personnel, unless explicitly operating on behalf of a State, are citizens with the same 
rights, duties and responsibilities as any other citizen. Their actions are primarily dependent 
on applicable national law, which could come from the flag State, the law of nationality of the 
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PCASP involved or in territorial waters the the coastal State. It might be possible that more 
than one State has jurisdiction over their actions. Generally, the right of maritime security 
guards to use of force is restricted to lawful acts either in self-defence or in the defence of 
others.176 UNCLOS does not contain any rules for the use of force by crewmembers or 
security guards. And concerns rise about whether PCASPs are even allowed to engage in fire 
fights on the high seas and whether they could therefore be sued by pirates or expose 
themselves to criminal liability.177 
However, one finds the concept of self-defence by merchant vessels against pirates already 
mentioned by the International Law Commission178 in their commentary to draft art. 45 on the 
Law of the Sea in 1956.179 In the ILC commentary it was stated that art. 45 does not apply in 
the case of a merchant ship which has repulsed an attack by a pirate ship and, in exercising its 
right of self-defence, overpowers the pirate ship and subsequently hands it over to a warship 
or to the authority of a coastal State. In this comment, the International Law Commission duly 
points out the existence of a right to self-defence on the high seas against pirates by private 
persons. It refers to the right of self-defence of human beings, a right which is recognised by 
all legal orders of the members of the international community. 180 This right of self-defence 
has to be strictly distinguished from the right of self-defence of States as embodied in art. 51 
of the United Nations Charter, which concerns cases of armed attacks against a Member of 
the United Nations and not against a merchant vessel.   
Although it is indisputable that the use of force by PMSC personnel is authorised and 
recognised by the international community, so long as it is used lawfully in self-defence or 
defence of others or in more limited circumstances in the defence of the vessel and its cargo, 
the intricacies of the type and degree of force that can be used remain unclear. Moreover, one 
cannot deduce defined rules for the use of force from the right to self-defence, mentioned in 
art. 45 of the ILC commentary. Many questions remain unsolved: May PMSC personnel 
lawfully fire warning shots or shots into an engine block? Are PMSC contractors allowed to 
use anticipatory self-defence if a pirate is about to fire a RPG at a ship with cargo of 
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petroleum? Which type of firearms may be used for a proportionate self-defence? Answers to 
these questions will depend on domestic legislation and case-law.  
However, it is suggested that the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by 
Law Enforcement Officials could provide adequate guide to legality.181 These Standards were 
adopted by the UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders in 
1990 and represent authoritative statements of international law that set out the principles on 
the use of force by the police. 
Principle nine of the Basic Principles states that lethal force may only be used intentionally 
when strictly unavoidable in order to protect life.  Regarding warning shots, the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Seas seems to suggest that a warning shot does not constitute a 
use of force. In the Saiga case, the court described the practice to stop a ship at sea.182The 
M/V Saiga was an oil tanker flying the flag of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. The tanker 
crossed the maritime boundary between Guinea and Guinea Bissau and entered illegally the 
exclusive economic zone of Guinea. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines claimed that Guinea 
used excessive and unreasonable force in stopping and arresting the Saiga. The Court decided 
that the use of force must be avoided as far as possible and, where force is unavoidable, it 
must not go beyond what is reasonable and necessary in the circumstances.183 Considerations 
of humanity must apply in the law of the sea, as they do in other areas of international law. 
Afterwards, the judgement says that to stop a ship, first of all, internationally recognised 
auditory or visual signals should be given; where this does not succeed, a variety of shots may 
be fired, including the firing of shots across the bows of the ship.184 If this fails, as a last 
resort, the pursuing vessel may use force. 185 
 
bb) The question of the detention of pirates 
Another important question arises if PMSC personnel actually repulse an attack and capture 
one of the attackers. As the ILC Commentary to art. 45 already indicates, a detained pirate has 
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to be handed over to a warship or to the authorities of the coastal State. During his detention 
on board, he must be provided with adequate food and water.186 For PMSC contractors, there 
is the potential concern that by detaining prisoners, they are in fact kidnapping them. But most 
national laws cover the detention of a suspected criminal under the basis of a form of citizen 
arrest until they can be handed over to the authorities.187 Furthermore, some domestic 
legislation include a master’s power to detain a person on board.188 Therefore, it can be stated 
that PMSC guards generally have the right to detain pirates after an attack until they can hand 
them over to the military or other security authorities.  
 
cc) Interim conclusion 
Although domestic law may have different degrees of force that may lawfully be used in self-
defence or rules about the detention of a criminal, it is highly important that PMSC employees 
clearly understand their legal rights, duties and responsibilities.  A unification of all the 
different regulations across national jurisdictions and better transparency in this area would be 
beneficial for better control over the use and conduct of PMSCs.189 
 
d) The obligation to rescue at sea 
Another important issue regarding the use of PMSCs is the duty to render assistance which 
international law imposes on the master of a vessel to rescue anyone in danger of being lost at 
sea. The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea of 1974, the International 
Convention on Salvage of 1989 and especially Art. 98 UNCLOS all deal with the rescue at 
sea. According to art. 98 UNCLOS, this duty is not absolute but rather qualified on the basis 
that the rendering of assistance would not pose a serious danger to the ship, the crew or the 
passengers. For example, if a ship with armed security guards on board gets informed about a 
nearby attack of another ship, it would have to render assistance as long as it is reasonable.190 
Assistance would not be reasonable in the case of a non-armed ship, because it is barely able 
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to help and would risk of being attacked as well. A ship with PCASP on board or with armed 
escort boats could repulse the attack. Therefore, the master could be obligated to help, leading 
to a negative side effect of using PMSCs for shipping companies because the ships would 
need to interrupt the original transit to render assistance. But it has to be noted that the 
obligation rests with the master of the ship, not its crew or PMSC personnel. 191  
 
8. Result   
International Law does not contain rules concerning the use of private maritime security 
guards. A look into different sources, from the international humanitarian law, S.C. 
resolutions, the Law of the Sea and international custom did not show any profound legal 
foundations for the employment of private maritime security companies. Even though the 
number of PMSCs around the globe has risen, international conventions have not adopted the 
issue yet. The different attitudes of States, even from same regions, shows that the 
international community struggles to find a comprehensive, effective solution in terms of 
international binding regulations for this relatively new problem. One main reason for this 
ambiguity rests in the fact that existing international treaties regarding conflicts are structured 
around diplomacy and that the State itself as a sovereign is seen as the cornerstone of 
international law, rather than the international community.192  Regarding the Law of the Sea, 
one has to say that the maritime world remains partly unregulated. The principle of the 
Freedom of the Seas embodies the concept that nations and private enterprises should freely 
use the world’s oceans without infringement by other nations.193  
One the one hand, this unregulated field creates a legal gap for armed contractors. 
Poor coastal and port State legislations in third world countries potentially create legal grey 
areas for practices of maritime security providers. As a consequence, the risk exists of 
unaddressed human rights and other criminal violations. On the other hand, shipping masters 
also face difficulties for the employment of maritime guards and escort vessels due to many 
different regulations in coastal and port States. The carriage of firearms through territorial 
waters or into ports in particular continues to be a key issue throughout the different national 
legislations. As a result, the entry into ports can be denied, privately contracted armed security 
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personnel (PCASP) can be sanctioned and prosecuted and as a result weapons and equipment 
can be confiscated. It remains challenging for shipping masters and companies to cope with 
all these problems and this can certainly lead to cost-intensive delays. The current legal 
situation in international law can be described as a complex field which is opaque for the 
shipping industry and security providers. The problem of piracy and armed robbery on the 
open water has risen over the last decades in different areas of the world. Governments and 
State navies are not ready to keep the oceans safe from the threat of piracy,. Hence, private 
actors stepped into this gap to protect the merchant vessels by taking over traditional 
governmental functions. The carriage of weapons and the use of force on the high seas in 
particular are tasks which are normally exercised by state organs due to the state monopoly on 
the use of force. The lack of detailed and uniform rules concerning the private security 
providers, lead to a huge legal grey area. 
 
 Shipping masters and security companies seem no other choice than accepting these 
problematic legal conditions. One has to observe future State practice and possible responses 




V. Possible Regulations and existing soft law standards 
In the following chapter, we want to point out how States could regulate the maritime security 
sector and which legal issues should be regulated. Certain key points and mechanisms will be 
suggested and we want to analyse how different international organisations already created 
guidance and mechanisms to standardise the use of Private Maritime Security Companies 
(PMSCs). Different mechanisms created by the UN and one of its agencies, the International 
Maritime Organisation (IMO) will be presented. Approaches by other international 
organisations, mainly from the shipping and the security sector will be set out and the effect 
of the existing standards and mechanisms will be analysed. Finally, rules by regional bodies 




1. A State’s duty to regulate and to protect human rights 
 As a result of the legal problems regarding the use of maritime security guards, States need to 
be obliged to establish enforceable laws and mechanisms for the use of PMSCs to ensure an 
effective protection of human rights. Especially problems concerning the state monopoly on 
the use of force cannot be left unregulated due to the risk of serious human rights violations 
by private actors. Possible escalations of violence which could result from the use of firearms 
and carriage of armed personnel on board ships and maintain a permanent threat if armed 
guards traverse unregulated in international waters.  
 
The international community considered the importance of human rights violations by 
private entities in two different UN publications. Attempts towards a legal foundation for the 
regulation of private military and security companies was made by the UN Working Group on 
the use of mercenaries in its 2010 report.194 The Working Group published a draft Convention 
on Private Military and Security Companies, which has not been finalised and adopted yet.195 
The draft proposes in art. 4 para. 1 that States should have in place a legislative and 
administrative framework to regulate PMSC’s actions.   
A similar idea can be found in the UN Framework and the Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights. The Framework calls on the State’s duty to protect against 
human rights abuses committed by third parties. States are prompted to have a duty to protect 
against human rights abuses by non-State actors, including businesses, affecting persons 
within their territory or jurisdiction.196 The UN ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework for 
Business and Human Rights was drafted in 2008 and supported by the Human Rights 
Council.197  It clearly includes the work of PMSCs during their maritime employment. Based 
on this Framework, the UN Special Representative on Business and Human Rights also 
                                                 
194 Report of the UN Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and 
impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination, Human Rights Council Resolution A 
/HRC/15/25, 2 July 2010. 
195 Draft of a possible Convention on Private Military and Security Companies for consideration and action by 
the Human Rights Council (hereafter: Draft Convention). 
196 Human Rights Council Resolution A/HRC/8/5, 7 April 2008, para 8. 
197 UN ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework for Business and Human Rights, Human Rights Council 
Resolution A/HRC/8/5, 7 April 2008. 
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published the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights198 to provide practical 
recommendations for the UN Framework’s implementation. The Guiding Principles 
emphasise existing standards applicable to all States and all businesses as well. The Principles 
have therefore implications both for flag States and the States of registration and operation of 
PMSC’s providing services.199 The Guiding Principles represent a consensus of the 
international community, creating a global business-human rights standard. 
 
 As a consequence, States need to implement effective laws to prevent possible human 
right violations. Hereby, the following five aspects need to be regulated in particular: 
- The use of force 
- The carriage of firearms 
- General training and conduct of armed guards  
- Reporting instruments 






2. Key legal aspects and existing soft law standards 
 
a) The use of force 
Laws regarding the use of force are one of the elementary rules which are essential in the 
regulation of private security providers. Armed personnel need clear regulations when and 
how they are allowed to react to attacks. Regulations concerning the use of force exist in all 
jurisdictions of the world in several penal codes or acts, but there are no binding international 
regulations for private actors. As a result, armed personnel are at a risk to ignore known 
domestic rules while travelling through international waters or into other jurisdictions. 
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Generally, non-violent means have to be considered before it is resorted to the use of force 
and firearms. Security operators shall only be allowed to defend themselves or other people 
against what they believe to be an imminent unlawful threat of death or serious body injury, in 
respect of the exercise of the essential right of self-defence. The use of force shall be 
proportionate in order to minimise damage or injury. 
The international community and the private sector developed different guidance regarding 
the use of force over the last years. 
 
aa)  100 Series rules for the use of force 
In May 2013, different maritime and security groups developed the 100 Series Rules as an 
independent set of maritime rules for the use of force (RUF).200 Along the group of the 
drafters were organisations such as the International Chamber of Shipping, the UN 
Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, BIMCO, the Republic of the Marshall 
Islands and Lloyd’s Register.201 The 100 Series rules complement current industry RUF 
guidance on the drafting of RUF, international standards and are in accordance with national 
and international law.202  
The purpose of the RUF is twofold. Firstly, to provide PCASP, Master and crew with 
guidance on lawful graduated response measures and lawful use of force in accordance with 
the right of self-defence when subjected to either perceived or actual acts of maritime piracy, 
armed robbery or hijacking.203 Secondly, to reduce risk to the Master, crew, PMSC, ship 
owner, charterer, insurer and underwriters of civil liability claims and/or potential criminal or 
other charges.204 The rules do not, however, provide any form of defence, indemnity or 
immunity against civil or criminal liability when force has been used unlawfully.205 
                                                 
200 The 100 Series Rules, 1st Edition, adopted on 3 May 2015 (hereafter 100 Series Rules), available at 
https://100seriesrules.com/uploads/20130503-100_Series_Rules_for_the_Use_of_Force.pdf (last seen: 26 
October 2015). 
201 See list of supporting entities: https://100seriesrules.com/uploads/Supporting_Entities-Updated.pdf (last seen: 
26 October 2015). 
202 100 Sereies Rules, Scope, Nr. 4 and Nr. 5; see also 100 Series Rules Website, available at:  
https://100seriesrules.com/ (last seen: 26 October 2015). 
203 100 Series Rules, Purpose, Nr. 2. 
204 100 Series Rules, Purpose, Nr. 2. 
205 100 Series Rules, Fundamental Principles, Nr. 11.  
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 Basically, the 100 Series rules provide a graduated four step guideline for responding 
to an eventual attack on the open water. Rule 100 states that armed guards shall advise the 
Master or the Officer of the Watch in the event of any actual, perceived or threatened attack 
by third parties if they intend to invoke these RUF. 
Another important rule is that warnings or as a next step warning shots should be used before 
using lethal force.206  Lethal force shall only be used as a last resort in self-defence when 
under attack or when an attack is imminent and has to be reasonable and necessary.207  
The 100 Series Rules are a detailed model set and an example of best practice for maritime 
rules of force. They not only contain elementary rules of force, but also explain 
comprehensively the purpose, scope and fundamental principles as well as key definitions for 
the use of the rules. They do not bind flag States as to their use, but instead provide a choice 
for their potential incorporation into national guidance as determined by respective 
governments and authorities.   
 
bb) The International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers  
In November 2010, the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service 
Providers208 was released. The ICoC is a set of non-binding standards for security companies 
to respect human rights and the rules of humanitarian law.209  It is a multi-stakeholder 
initiative developed as a complement to the Montreux Document.  The initiative was launched 
by a multi-stakeholder initiative in 2009 with the assistance of the Government of Switzerland 
and in consultation with the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States, as 
well as other stakeholders and relevant experts.210 The Code aims to clarify international 
standards for the private security industry operating in complex environments and to improve 
                                                 
206 100 Series Rules, Rule 101 and 102. 
207 100 Series Rules, Rule 103. 
208 The International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers,  adopted on 9 November 2010,  
available under:  http://www.icoca.ch/en/the_icoc (last seen: 30 September 2015), hereafter ICoC. 
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oversight and accountability of such companies.211 By September 2013, 708 companies had 
formally committed to operate in accordance with the Code of Conduct.212 
 The ICoC, although mainly dealing with private security companies operating on-land, 
is also applicable to the maritime sector. Art. 13 states that the Code refers to ‘actions of 
Signatory Companies while performing Security Services in Complex Environments’. The 
ICoC defines Complex Environments in section B as ‘any areas experiencing or recovering 
from unrest or instability, whether due to natural disasters or armed conflicts, where the rule 
of law has been substantially undermined, and in which the capacity of the state authority to 
handle the situation is diminished, limited, or non-existent. The reference to ‘any areas’ 
instead of to ‘any territory’ suggests that the definition was intended to be broader than acts 
within the exclusive territorial jurisdiction of a State.213 Regarding the requirement of a 
complex environment, one can say that countries such as the Congo, Liberia or Somalia are 
certainly unstable and still suffering from the aftermaths of civil wars. 
Additionally, the maritime security services are expressly mentioned in art. 7 of the ICoC and 
many of its signatories are engaged in maritime security.214 
In signing the ICOC, companies commit to supporting the rule of law, respecting the 
human rights of all persons and protecting the interests of all persons.215 Art. 30 of the ICoC 
encourages PSC personnel to take all reasonable steps to avoid the use of force, and only use 
it if proportionate and reasonable. Art. 33 of the Code also deals with the detention of persons, 
a matter which is not addressed in other presented standards. 
Security companies are advised to will only, guard, transport, or question detainees if the 
Company has been specifically contracted to do so by a state and its Personnel are trained in 
the applicable national and international law. The prohibition of   torture or other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment during detention is also emphasized.216  
 
By taking a closer look at the ICoC, one has to mention that it does not bring any 
innovations in international law; it rather recalls provisions from international and national 
                                                 
211 Priddy & Casey-Maslen, p. 853. 
212 Website of the ICoC Association, available under: http://www.icoca.ch/en/history (last seen 30 September 
2015). 
213 Priddy & Casey-Maslen, p. 853. 
214 Priddy & Casey-Maslen, p. 853 
215 Art. 3 ICoC. 
216 Art. 33, para. 2 ICoC. 
67 
  
laws and serves like the Montreux document as a guideline. It merely tries to encourage 
voluntary compliance.217 It applies to a broad number of different security firms – from the 
protection civilians in war zones, to risk management, to training forces.218 The ICoC itself 
does not really include PMSCs with it’s the defensive competence and focuses more on 
humanitarian aspects. The shipping industry needs provisions specified for maritime threats.  
 
cc) The draft Convention on PMSCs on the use of force 
Art. 18 (3) of the  draft Convention on Private Military and Security Companies states that the 
use of force need to be in proportion to the seriousness of the offence and that damage and 
injury has to be minimised. Furthermore, security guards need to respect and preserve human 
life and it has to be ensured that assistance and medical aid are rendered to any injured or 
affected persons at the earliest possible moment.  
 
b) The carriage of firearms 
Security providers need to have an understanding of flag State, port State and coastal State 
laws and requirements with respect to the possession, carriage, and movement of firearms, 
ammunition and other security related equipment. On the one hand it is the full responsibility 
of the security companies to know and to follow these laws.  
On the other hand, States should provide clearly the relevant information to anyone who is 
eventually entering territorial waters or ports. Comprehensive information regarding the 
import, export and movement of firearms and ammunition within the country, the exact type 
of permitted arms and penalties in case of breaches need to exist and need to be published in a 
transparent way. This is not only important for international security companies, but also for 
private persons who want to bring guns into a country.  
 
c) Training and conduct of armed guards towards the shipping master 
A certain level of quality in the training and the employment of security personnel would help 
to achieve a standard in which human rights violations are less likely to occur and safety 
requirements are met. Hence, security personnel should especially be trained in the handling 
of weapons, attack scenarios, maritime safety and first aid. Additionally, operators need to 
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know relevant rules of engagement and legal aspects of their work. The capture and the 
dealing with pirates are an important aspect which the maritime guards need to be trained in.  
Permanent seminars, trainings and on board manoeuvres are essential to comply with these 
requirements. 
The position of the guards towards the shipping master and other ship personnel must be clear 
and the chain of command must be clarified in advance of the operation.  
 
aa) ISO/PAS 28007  
As a result of the increased employment of privately contracted armed security personnel 
PCASP), the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) released a standard 
document in 2012 to help instil confidence and ensure the safety, efficiency and reliability 
concerning the use of maritime security providers. The ISO is an independent, non-
governmental membership organization and the world's largest developer of voluntary 
International Standards with 162 member countries constituting the national standards bodies 
around the world.219 The guiding document is called publicly available specification 28007 
(ISO/PAS 28007).220 It was developed at the request of the IMO’s Maritime Safety 
Committee and supported by major international corporations, intelligence and law 
enforcement agencies such as INTERPOL, and the European Commission.221 The document 
deals with security aspects such as planning, resources, training and awareness, 
communication and documentation and generally follows the provision of the IMO 
guidance.222 It outlines practical requirements for elements like scene and casualty 
management, incident reporting and investigation, health and safety, and customer complaints 
and also includes recommendations for performance evaluation such as monitoring, audits, 
management and continual improvement.223  
                                                 
219 ISO website, About ISO, available at: http://www.iso.org/iso/home/about.htm (last seen: 5 October 2015).   
220 ISO/PAS 28007:2012, Ships and marine technology, Guidelines for Private Maritime Security Companies 
providing privately contracted armed security personnel on board ships (and pro forma contract), adopted on 15 
December 2012.  
221 ISO website, Fighting piracy - ISO guidelines for armed maritime guards, available at: 
http://www.iso.org/iso/news.htm?refid=Ref1717 (last seen: 5 October 2015).  
222 ISO website, Fighting piracy - ISO guidelines for armed maritime guards, available at: 
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It has to be mentioned that two key issues are missing in the ISO/PAS 28007; namely 
the responsibility of maritime security companies to respect human rights and to carry out 
human rights due diligence processes. The standard needs clearly to be improved in the field 
of international human rights law.  
 
bb) MarSecPro Standard 
In 2011, another international organisation, the International Association of Maritime Security 
Professionals (IAMSP) published guidance regarding the conduct of maritime security guards. 
The non-profit, volunteer organisation IAMSP was founded in 2010 as the result of a 
perceived need by a number of private entities to raise the level of professional conduct within 
the maritime security industry.  The most notable document is the Maritime Security 
Professionals Voluntary Professional Code of Practice, also known as the MarSecPro 
Standard.224 MarSecPro aims to establish and promote high quality education and personal 
development at all levels throughout the maritime security industry.225 The Code defines the 
professional standards expected of maritime security professionals and provides an 
internationally recognized Certification scheme. The IAMSP also published other guidance, 
e.g. for the vetting of training or the use of force. 
Nevertheless, the IAMSP guidance is merely a set of recommendations based on international 
law and business practices. It is not binding and it will be a matter of each armed contractor 
exercising his personal judgement in meeting the requirements of the mentioned standards.226 
 
cc) ASIS 
The American Security Industry Society (ASIS), an international society of security 
professionals counting over 38,000 members, has also developed a set of standards and 
guidelines for security companies.227 ASIS has developed PSC.1, a standard based on the 
Montreux Document and the ICOC for private security companies operating on land overseas. 
In 2013, ASIS released PSC.4, a guideline for implementing PSC.1 in the maritime 
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environment in accordance with the ISO 28000:2007 standard.228 The aim of PSC.4 is to 
provide quality assurance in all security related activities and functions while demonstrating 
accountability to law and respect for human rights. Hence, this guidance follows the already 
outlined ISO standards and its acceptance by security companies is only voluntarily.  
 
d) Reporting instruments 
A detailed reporting mechanism could help to collect information about pirate attacks and the 
conduct of PCASP. Security companies should make sure that the PCASP team leader 
maintains a log recording every incident in which firearms are deployed, to be acknowledged 
by the master. Such incidents should be documented in detail in the form of a piracy report.  
Security teams should ensure that a formal written report of each incident involving the use 
of force is made by the PCASP team leader and acknowledged by the master. This report has 
to include the  time and location of the incident, details of events leading up to the incident, 
written statements by those involved in the incident from the PCASP team and injuries and/or 
material damage sustained. The report has to be forwarded to the ship owner or operator and 
relevant photo or video material needs to be added. 
These suggestions are also implemented in the ISO PAS 28007 Standards and in para. 63 of 
the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers. 
 
e) Employment and licensing procedures 
Before ship owners or operators employ a PMSC, they must have the opportunity to analyse 
and to rate the security company. Therefore, the security company structure and place of 
registration, the company ownership, its financial position and the extent of insurance cover 
must be published. Further important information is the operational competence and the 
senior management experience, general and specific to the task of the company. 
Certification and licensing procedures are the most effective way to provide reliable quality 
management indicators and to maintain a high standard of security companies. A coherent 
international licensing system whereby flag States could certify maritime security guards 
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would be a possible action. The certification would need to include standards for personnel 
qualification, training and penalties for non-compliance. 
 
aa) GUARDCON  
Due to changing national laws regarding to the use of PMSCs and the possession of firearms 
on-board of ships, the shipping organisation BIMCO decided in 2011 to help to clarify the 
situation for shipping masters.229 In March 2012 BIMCO’s Documentary Committee 
published a ‘standard contract for the employment of security guards on vessels’, called 
GUARDCON.230 The contract provides shippers and PMSCs with a framework for the 
understanding of their respective rights and obligations. GUARDCON sets out basic 
requirements of PMSCs providing on-board guards, mainly in the areas of firearms licensing, 
insurance and liability.231 The nature of the Contract GUARDCON is intended to be a multi-
functional agreement which can be used for single transits or as a framework agreement for 
multiple transits.232 GUARDCON is only a standard contract; it does not impose any 
enforceable provisions. It helps to outline standards, by taking “all reasonable skill and care” 
as the benchmark for providing the agreed security services.233 Therefore it has only a very 
limited impact on the regulation of the PMSC industry. 
 
bb) SAMI Accreditation  
A highly influential maritime security organisation was founded in 2011, the Security 
Association for the Maritime Industry (SAMI). SAMI has a broad number of international 
members with over 120 maritime security providers, consultants, trainers and maritime 
security equipment, technology and hardware manufacturers.234 Its aim is to develop 
guidance, documentation, education, training and innovative technological solutions for the 
maritime security sector.235 SAMI certifies PMSCs through a three-step process. At first, it 
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analyses the PMSCs records.236 Secondly, SAMI conducts an on-site audit that tests the 
“implementation, readiness, conduct of operations, personnel management and logistics” of 
the PMSC.237 Hereby, SAMI decided to use the ISO/PAS 28007 guidance as its key standards 
for accreditation.238  Finally, the PMSC’s operational capabilities will be tested during an 
operational site visit. The certification process started with a number of auditing companies, 
such as Lloyd’s Register Quality Assurance, MSS Global or RTI Forensics, and some of the 
big maritime security companies have already been certified.239 
The certification procedure is clearly a welcoming step in regulating the PMSC 
industry. The certification confirms that various legal, compliance and quality issues have 
been adequately addressed and lead to a positive recognition of members in the maritime 
industry. Nevertheless, these standards are only voluntary. Major PMSCs will likely follow 
them to demonstrate their qualities and capabilities. But not necessarily all armed companies 
operating on the high seas will conduct themselves according to these high standards.240 
Therefore, it has to be observed how many PMSCs will go through all the steps of the 
certification process and if the standard has a lasting impact on the conduct of PMSCs.  
 
cc) The International Code of Conduct Association 
From the beginning, the ICoC process foresaw the establishment of an independent 
mechanism for governance and oversight. This led to the foundation of the ICoC 
Association241 in 2013 as a Swiss non-profit association. The purpose of the ICoCA is to 
govern and oversee the implementation of the ICoC, and to promote the responsible provision 
of private security services.  Its main functions are to provide and support certification, 
monitoring and complaints resolution. The ICoCA’s board of directors meeting voted on 29 
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July 2015 to accept the proposed Certification Procedures, so that all member companies will 
be required to become certified to an ICoCA-recognised standard.242   
 
dd) ISO/PAS 28007 
PMSCs can also get a certification when complying with ISO/PAS 28007 by accredited 
inspectors, known as Certification Bodies.243 Before a Certification Body can be appointed to 
carry out ISO/PAS 28007 inspections, it must itself attain national accreditation.244 The ISO 
standard is not necessarily expected to eliminate other national accreditation requirements, but 
it might reduce the extent to which the shipping industry has to conduct its own forms of due 
diligence. 
ISO/PAS 28007 gives a comprehensive international standard for the use of PMSCs. But one 
has to keep in mind that it is a non-binding instrument. Therefore, it is highly important that 
regulatory measures are enforced through the establishment of stringent national accreditation 
processes and that ship owner’s insist on employing PMSCs which are ISO/PAS 28007 
accredited, instead of relying on their own vetting processes.  
 
3. The IMO Circulars 
 The International Maritime Organisation is a specialised agency of the United Nations and is 
the global standard-setting authority for the safety, security and environmental performance of 
international shipping.245 Its main role is to create a regulatory framework for the shipping 
industry. It has 171 member States and three associated members.246 
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Officially, the IMO does not take a position on the carriage of arms on board ships. It states 
that it is the responsibility of the individual flag State and coastal State to determine if the use 
of armed security guards is appropriate and legal, if so under what conditions.247 
Due to the increased number of private armed security guards on the high seas, the IMO 
started in 2011 to publish various Circulars to give guidance on the topic. The ultimate goal of 
its interim guidance was to harmonise domestic policies for PMSCs across nations.  
In these four Circulars, all the mentioned key aspects towards a regulation of private maritime 
security companies are included. Therefore it is pointed out as a special document. 
Basically, the IMO drafted Interim Guidance targeting three different groups: 
 
aa) IMO Circular 1405 
 IMO Circular 1405 was issued for Ship owners, Ship Operators, and Shipmasters248, 
Circular 1405, as well as Circulars 1406 and 1443, deal with the employment and the conduct 
of PMSC guards. Circular 1405 contains rules concerning the use of force and encourages 
PCASP to use force only in self-defence that is strictly necessary and reasonable in response 
to a piratical attack.249 Furthermore, the IMO encourages ship owners in Circular 1405 to use 
a risk assessment and proper due diligence procedures before hiring armed guards.250 The 
Circular also provides ship owners with criteria for selecting and vetting security personnel 
and encourages ship owners to ensure that the personnel is adequately trained.251 
Additionally, the Circular at annex art. 5.16 suggests a reporting procedure. The master is 
advised to maintain a log of every circumstance in which firearms are discharged, whether 
accidental or deliberate.  
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bb) IMO Circular 1406 
IMO Circular 1406 gives Interim Recommendations for flag States.252 The IMO encourages 
them to adopt a policy on whether or not the use of PCASP will be authorized and, if so, 
under which conditions.253 It requests that flag States identify minimum requirements for 
PCASP as well as a process for authorizing their use.254 Finally, the Circular proposes the 
implementation of reporting and record-keeping requirements.255 
 
cc) IMO Circular 1408  
IMO Circular 1408 regards recommendations for port and coastal States256. It includes 
recommendations concerning aspects related to the embarkation, disembarkation and carriage 
of PCASP and of firearms and security-related equipment for use by PCASP. 257 Member 
Governments, and, in particular, those of the coastal States bordering the Indian Ocean, 
Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden and Red Sea, are asked to create policies and related procedures, 
which facilitate the movement of PCASP and of their firearms and security-related 
equipment. The shipping industry and to the PCASP service providers shall be informed 
about these policies and regulations.258 An important mentioned concern of the IMO is 
thereby that governments should not establish policies and procedures which hinder or may 
hinder the continuation of maritime trade or interfere with the navigation of ships and that 
they should ensure that all are consistent with international law.259 
 
                                                 
252IMO, MSC.1-Circ. 1406-Rev.3, Revised Interim Recommendations for Flag States regarding the use of 
Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel on board ships in the High Risk Area, adopted on 12 June 2015. 
253 IMO Circular 1406, at annex art. 5. 
254 IMO Circular 1406, at annex art. 5.2.; Mahard, p. 348. 
255 255 IMO Circular 1406, at annex art. 5.2.7. 
256 IMO, MSC.1-Circ.1408-Rev1 Revised interim recommendations for Port and Coastal States regarding the 
use of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel on board ships in the High Risk Area, adopted on 25 May 
2012. 
257 IMO Circular 1408, at annex art. 1. 
258 IMO Circular 1408, at annex art. 5. 
259 IMO Circular 1408, at annex art. 6. 
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dd) IMO Circular 1443  
 IMO Circular 1443 directly addresses PMSCs.260The Circular recognises that flag States have 
the sole discretion to permit PCASPs to operate aboard its vessels as per art. 92 UNCLOS.261 
The Circular at annex art. 3.1 suggests that PMSCs should establish procedures to provide 
maritime security services to ship owners and ship operators and to comply with all relevant 
legal requirements. 
Besides guidance for the use of force, Circular 1443 also deals with certification, insurance 
cover, management and other deployment considerations.262 
Furthermore, risk assessments and compliance mechanisms such as, documentation, 
certification, authorisation and reporting procedures for the use of PMSCs are proposed.263 
 
 ee) Analysis of IMO Circulars 
As shown above, the IMO provides a comprehensive guiding framework to those who are 
affected by PMSCs. All the Circulars have in common that they are non-legally binding and 
can therefore only be seen as recommendations.  States are only urged to bring them to the 
attention of all national agencies concerned with anti-piracy activities, ship owners, ship 
operators, shipping companies, shipmasters and crews. IMO’s member governments are 
further urged to take any necessary action to implement, as appropriate, the revised interim 
recommendations given in the annexes. The documents do not define self-defence or when 
force is strictly necessary and reasonable. Furthermore, they do not deal with accountability 
mechanisms and detailed ship owner’s obligations. Hence, we have to sum up that the IMO’s 
guidelines demonstrate an elaborate framework for the use of PMSCs, but for a proper 
regulation, more practical and enforceable standards are required.264  
 
                                                 
260 IMO, MSC.1-Circ. 1443, Interim guidance to Private Maritime Security Companies providing Privately 
Contracted Armed Security Personnel on board ships in the High Risk Area, adopted on 25 May 2012. 
261 IMO Circular 1443, at annex art. 1.2. 
262 IMO Circular 1443, at annex art. 2; 3.4ff.; 4; 5.  
263 IMO Circular 1406, at. Annex art. 5.1; IMO circular 1443, at annex art. 3.1. 
264 Mahard, p. 349.  
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3. Interim conclusion 
The last sections gave a brief overview over several attempts of international organisations 
and entities to create legal and ethical guidance for the use of private armed maritime security 
guards on board of ships. 
 
One the one hand, it can be summarised that a comprehensive patchwork of 
regulations, as well as private sector codes of conducts and mechanisms, already exists.  
In many areas, the standards and regulations overlap. Some concentrate more on rules for the 
use of force or humanitarian issues, others concern the practical employment of armed 
contractors or implement accreditation processes. Some of the regulations are addressing 
States, others shipmasters and owners or directly security companies. The set of regulations 
could lead to the sort of long-term stability of the PMSC industry which it never enjoyed 
before the African piracy epidemic.265 But on the other hand, all of the mentioned sets of rules 
have in common that they are not legally binding and thus can be described as soft law in 
contrast to the binding traditional law, often referred to as “hard law”. The regulations of the 
UN, the IMO and the other organisations give merely flexible incentives, recommendations, 
best management practices and guidance. They often only recall already existing national and 
international law but do not impose any enforceable rules on States or private actors.  As a 
result, States need to incorporate detailed legal and administrative frameworks into their 
domestic law. Even if often a general framework already exists, more specific regulations and 
guidance is urgently needed, especially for the use of force and firearms.266 
In addition, one needs to rely on the shipping and the security industry to accept the 
proposed regulations and mechanisms and hope that they will be fully implemented. Hereby, 
it is often criticised that self-binding regulations often depend too much on the responsibility 
of the operating companies themselves, and the idea that a fear of a loss in reputation due to a 
breach of the soft law standards would keep companies from breaching them.267 Furthermore, 
there is a risk that not all of the PMSCs will undergo prestigious certification processes like 
the SAMI membership. As a consequence, shipmasters could willingly hire unlicensed guards 
to cut operational costs.268 
                                                 
265 Pitney & Levin, p. 106. 
266 Priddy & Casey Maslen, p. 842f. 
267 Spearin, p. 832f. 
268 Pitney & Levin, p. 106. 
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Nevertheless, without any binding international regulations or detailed national law, 
the maritime and the security sector are left to regulate themselves. Hence, it remains to be 
seen how States incorporate rules concerning the use of PMSCs and how many private 
security companies undergo certification processes like the SAMI accreditation. 
In order to ensure the compliance with these regulations, States should impose rules about 
jurisdictional questions and international reporting requirements. Furthermore, rules 
concerning accountability of PMSC personnel need to be established. Criminal, civil or 
administrative sanctions on offenders need to be set out and sufficient remedies to victims of 
violations of mentioned rules have to be provided.    
The establishment of an international, non-profit organisation to govern and approve PMSCs 
would be facilitation for the work of local authorities, shipping owners and security providers 
and could minimise the risk of human rights violations through a certain degree of control. 
 
4. Regional regulations 
The following section aims to find regional regulations for the use of private armed maritime 
guards and to show the position of different regional bodies towards them. 
 
a) ReCAAP 
The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against 
Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) is the first regional government-to-government agreement to 
promote and enhance cooperation against piracy and armed robbery in Asia.269 The agreement 
was finalised on 11 November 2004 and entered into force on 4 September 2006. To date, 20 
States have become Contracting Parties to ReCAAP, mostly Asian countries but also 
Australia, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, the U.K. and the US.270. 
In the ReCAAP, the use of PMSCs is not mentioned. Article 16 states that ‘each Contracting 
Party shall encourage ships, ship owners, or ship operators, where appropriate, to take 
protective measures against piracy and armed robbery against ships, taking into account the 
relevant international standards and practices, in particular, recommendations adopted by the 
International Maritime Organization.’ Hereby, the contracting parties merely accept and 
                                                 
269 Geiss & Petrig, p. 45ff.; Hohenstein, p. 17. 




reaffirm the guidance of the IMO with its respective Circulars. But they did not create specific 




b) African regulations 
Also African countries have taken serious steps towards the combat against piracy and armed 
robbery at sea. Therefore the Djibouti Code of Conduct271 and the Code of Conduct 
concerning the repression of piracy, armed robbery against ships, and illicit maritime activity 
in West and Central Africa were established. They aim to promote greater regional 
cooperation between signatories and to enhance their effectiveness in the prevention, 
interdiction, prosecution, and punishment of persons engaging in piracy and armed robbery 
against ships.272 Nevertheless, both codes do not deal with the issue of private maritime 
security at all.  
 
c) Law of the European Union  
One does not find distinct regulations of the private maritime security industry in the law of 
the European Union (EU). The position of the EU towards PMSCs can only be taken from  
documents of the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC). In 2013, the EESC 
called on member States to allow the use of private armed guards ‘subject to a strict legal 
framework which makes the training of guards, inter alia, the responsibility of the member 
State of their establishment and lays down the terms of the master’s responsibility, 
particularly in the event of shots being fired.’273. The EESC published in 2014 another 
opinion paper about maritime security which dealt with the use of PMSCs as well.274 In point 
1.14 it was claimed that ‘internationally agreed standards for maritime security companies 
                                                 
271 Djibouti Code of Conduct, signed on 29 January 2009;  Code of Conduct concerning the repression of piracy, 
armed robbery against ships, and illicit maritime activity in West and Central Africa, signed on the 25 June 2013. 
272 Geiss & Petrig, p. 48. 
273 Record of the Proceedings of the European Economic and Social Committee on Maritime piracy: 
strengthening the EU response, 486th plenary session, Brussels, 16 and 17 January 2013, agenda item 10, Point 
1.7.  
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should be introduced. The ISOPAS 28007 standard will ensure a level playing field for 
private armed guard companies globally’. And in point 4.1, the document reaffirms that ‘the 
EESC fully supports the on-board protective measures introduced by shipping companies, as 
well as the internationally agreed standards regarding private armed guards on ships’.  
  
d) Result 
As a result, one can say that at least Asian and European regional bodies generally accept the 
use of private armed security personnel on board of commercial vessels. Furthermore, they 
call on member States to implement specific rules for the use of PMSCs and the use of force 
and the carriage of weapons respectively. Hereby, they refer to the guidance of the IMO and 
in consequence above mentioned IMO Circulars.275 This referral is only logical because of the 
membership of the ReCAAP and EU States in the IMO. Hence, it can be said that it lies upon 





1. Summary of the investigation 
The purpose of this study was to find the international legal foundations and requirements for 
the use of PMSCs when operating on the high seas. 
Present documents of international humanitarian law were scrutinized in chapter III. Hereby, 
the applicability of the Geneva Conventions was denied due to the absence of an international 
armed conflict for the issue of piracy. Furthermore, the Montreux Document, the Draft 
International Convention on the Regulation, Oversight and Monitoring of Private Military and 
Security Companies and various SC Resolutions concerning piracy were presented and it was 
concluded that no document imposed legally binding regulations for the use of maritime 
security guards. In this context, the question whether privately contracted armed security 
guards could be seen as mercenaries under the UN Mercenary Convention was investigated 
but not answered in the affirmative. 
                                                 
275 See p. 44ff.  
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Chapter IV dealt with the application of the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Seas. Thereby, a closer look was taken into existing rules about the use of force in self-
defence and the problem of the carriage of weapons through different maritime zones was 
analysed. First of all, no specific rules were found in the UNCLOS for the use of PMSCs.  
Secondly, it was pointed out that laws and regulations may change in each maritime zone. 
PMSC operators therefore need to consider that change during their missions. The law of the 
flag State may differ from regulations of coastal or port States. The use of maritime PCASP is 
therefore complex und jurisdictional questions remain unresolved due to many different 
regulations in coastal and port States. Especially the carriage of firearms through territorial 
waters or into ports continues to be a key issue throughout the different national legislations. 
Furthermore, the use of individual self-defence is not regulated by binding rules in 
international law and is dependent on national legislations of the flag State of the traversing 
vessel.  
Despite of the lack of binding international regulations, the field of maritime security 
is targeted by a vast number of international soft law standards and mechanisms, developed 
by international organisations, the shipping industry and the security sector. Clear regulations 
by regional bodies such as the EU or other State unions are not yet available. 
 
Taking everything into consideration, I come to the conclusion that a legal gap exists for the 
use of private maritime security companies operating on the high seas. The described practical 
problems for State navies and coast guards276 in the fight against pirates lead to the fact that 
the private security sector takes over naval functions. And governments, navies and the 
shipping industry seem to accept this shift towards a private solution. 
But we do not find detailed enforceable regulations in international law concerning this shift.  
The fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea remains legally an issue at State level. The 
use of force, the protection of nationals and the detention of individuals are traditionally State 
functions, not of private individuals.  Not every State has implemented comprehensive rules 
for the use of PMSCs yet. Moreover, security companies can easily operate outside of 
territorial waters and shipping companies can fly under a flag of convenience of a State with 
lax regulations towards maritime armed guards to evade strict domestic legislations 
concerning PMSCs.  
                                                 
276 See Chapter II. 2. 
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The commercial shipping industry is still in the early stages of incorporating PMSC 
regulations because of the relatively new phenomena of PMSCs and the respective regulatory 
problems. But self-regulating mechanisms of the shipping and security industry will not 
replace the power of sovereign States to regulate the security sector or to investigate and 
prosecute violations of their laws. Incidents on the High Seas differ fundamentally from 
incidents on land. Violent confrontations between armed contractors and pirates could stay 
undetected and law enforcement is generally far more difficult far away from the coastline 
compared to territorial investigations.  One has to observe future State practice and possible 
responses by the international community to see if fundamental binding regulations will be 
implemented. 
 
2. Final conclusion 
The absence of a standardised and enforceable regulatory framework governing PMSCs and 
PCASP in the maritime domain has left a considerable part of armed maritime security 
regulation in the domain of flag States. Flag State laws and regulations on the employment 
and management of PCASP vary substantially and range from permissive and clear rules to 
total prohibition of deployment of PCASP on board commercial vessels. Nevertheless, clear 
and understandable regulation in every State is a key issue in preventing excessive force by 
armed contractors. States should have legislation in the following fields in regard to private 
maritime security providers:     
- The use of force 
- The carriage of firearms 
- General training and conduct of armed guards  
- Reporting instruments 
- Employment and certification procedures 
 
If they do not fulfil the obligations laid out by the flag State, PMSCs should be prohibited 
from travelling on board the vessel. 
Thereby, accreditation processes are essential to implement quality standards 
throughout the maritime security sector. They not only ensure that PMSCs can adequately 
perform the tasks they are contracted to perform, but additionally ensure that flag States are 
able to exercise effective control and eventually hold PMSCs accountable. Only flag States 
would be able to suspend a PMSCs operating license or prohibit a particular PMSC from 
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operating on that flag State's ships in case its employees act unlawful. Oversight mechanisms 
such as master and owner reports would clearly help to prevent misconduct. Notwithstanding 
the implementation of substantial regulatory measures by the majority of flag States, it is 
suggested that shipping registries ensure regulatory measures are enforced through the 
establishment of stringent national or international accreditation processes.277 Standardisation 
processes already exist, such as ISO/PAS 28007 and the SAMI accreditation, but these 
processes need to be mandatory for each security provider. In addition, PMSC personnel who 
have committed any international violations in the past should be excluded from certification.  
Legal gaps left by the regulation of flag States can be filled by regulations of coastal 
States or port States. They should require authorisation before a PMSC is operating within the 
State’s waters.278 This approach would pose difficulties for States that suffer from unstable or 
corrupt governments such as Somalia or Yemen, but the development of regulations would 
help to ensure that PMSC no longer fall through the cracks of international law.279   
 
As a result we have to state that international law does not contain specific rules or 
requirements for the employment of privately contracted armed guards in the fight against 
piracy. States, as well as the shipping companies and the security sector itself are the key 
players in regulating the use of PMSC. 
In practice, there are no real alternative methods to the use of PMSCs. The escort of 
merchant vessels by security boats, dispatching security teams from land bases280, an arming 
of the crew281 or dispatching single navy soldiers282 on ships do not really present a more 
effective solution for the protection of merchant vessels. But so far, there are not many reports 
about misconduct of armed personnel on the open waters, so that we are not on the point of 
comparing the situation with experiences from the Iraq and Afghanistan war related to private 
security companies. 
Hence, one has to observe the development of the maritime security situation as well 
as the efforts of the shipping and security industry to impose standards. States need to be 
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urged by international organisations and regional bodies such as the European or African 
Union to adopt national legislation concerning the use of PMSCs. 
